King George V class Battleships (1939)

The King Georges V class were not the last Battleship class of Great Britain (this goes to Vanguard), but the last to see action in WW2. These five fast battleship (still called “battlecruisers” in 1930) emerged from a long process of successive design requirements in the moratory, peacetime context of the interwar, going from 12 to 16-in main guns. How the apparently odd choice of 14-in guns (356 mm) was made in the end ? This article dives into detail in the class design, debunks some myths and states it was better protected and faster than generally assumed, as well as each wartime action and career of the King George V, Prince of Wales, Duke of York, Howe and Anson. #royalnavy #ww2 #bismarck #battleship #kinggeorgev #princeofwales

Genesis of the King George V design

The Royal Navy’s first fast battleships, following the ten-year Washington Treaty ban were the King George V class. A culmination of nearly 15 years of vacation since the Nelson design and updated by the first London Treaty (1930), making for another vacancy of 1937. At 38 000 standard tons, versus 35 000 tons, the future King George Vs were however a compromise as consideration of introducing new guns led to the adoption of a lower caliber (340 mm, 15 inches, versus the formidable 381 mm or 16 inches, on the Nelson class). This proved to be the greatest letdown of the design but there were reasons behind it. To improve protection also, almost the whole ship was protected (not ‘all or nothing’) but in order to rationalize armour, main turrets were adopted in quadruple form as in the French battleships.

There was still room for an extra twin turret in “B” for a total of 10 versus 9 guns on the Nelson, substantially equal range and higher rate of fire due to their new design. But these new mounts also caused many development problems and fixes were needed just as the war began. Speed was another bi selling point compared to the Nelsons. Outside KGV which entering service in December 1940, the others were HMS Prince of Wales, Duke of York, Howe, and Anson, respectively in March in November 1941, June and August 1942. Their career covered all theaters of operation except the mediterranean were older battleships were more “expendable”. HMS Prince of Wales was the only sank, and by the air force. As early as 1938, their replacement was planned but with a more rational three triple arrangement and 16-in guns, the Lion class, making the KGV “interim battleships”. HMS Lion, the first on order, was laid down in September 1939 but soon suspended and later cancelled. Vanguard was the very final design, making good of WWI era 16-in guns.

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Design development

Post Nelson designs

Genesis of this class way before 1936. The very early, initial design process started in 1928: Under Washington Naval Treaty’s 1922 “holiday” in force through to 1931 and with only left ten ‘super-dreadnoughts’, the QE and Revenge classes and the “special authorization”, slow Nelson-class battleships. So requirements for future warships needed in 1931 were laid down.
In 1929 there were considered 16-in guns designs with twin turrets, split secondary batteries but still slow ships with internal belt armor, very much a continuation of the Nelson class, but more conventional in their approach. The twin turrets were indeed generally eight, and heavenly placed fore and aft, unlike the Nelson class which tried a concentration of armour ot save weight. Indeed, it was planned that with the planned expiration of the Washington treaty in 1932, 36-38,000 tonnes designs would be approved, rather than the 35,000 tonnes after a renegociation.

The First London Naval Treaty of 1930 extended however this “shipbuilding holiday” to 1937 and more serious planning was done in 1935 based on the maximum 35,000 tons authorized, with alternatives having 16, 15-inch and 14-in main guns until the admirakty stuck on a 15-in main armament, based on 27 knots and a protection molded on the new assumptiopn decisive range was to be 12,000 to 16,000 yards. There was also an end to the “all of nothing” scheme, with a better, extended protection for fear of shattering effects of gunnery on unprotected parts of the ships. Below is the whole process.

1933 Staff Requirements

1933 specifications focused in speed and size, and again, up to 38,000 tonners were envisioned as per expected treaty renegociations. Considerations about speed looked as the Dunkerque and Scharnhorst, and examined guns, with a plethora of potential designs, still all relatively more conversative than the Nelsons, very much oddball prototypes. This led to a final 1933 set of requirements intended for a FY1937 capital ship (laid down in 1936).
It was planned that it would have:
-Four twin turrets in the classic QE/Revenge configuration (likely 16-in caliber)
-Twelve 6-in guns (152 mm) in battery mounting, not casemated.
-Extended AA of six guns either side, ideally 4 or 4.7 in, four PomPom and Vickers four 0.5 in HMGs
-Torpedo tubes above water, in quintuple mountings
-Protection hypothesis A (still 32K tons): Proof against 16 in shells/2000 Ibs bomb/1000 Ibs for terminal velocity
-Protection hypothesis A (Below 32K tons): Protection against 14 in shells but still 2000 Ibs bombs.
-Underwater protection: Proof against 1000 Ibs contact warhead
-Speed: 23 knots minimum
The admiralty transmitted this to the director of naval construction (CNT) which came back with a ship above 32,000 tonnes.

1930s Arms Geneva control Revisions

Yet, all this prove too optimistic. A meeting held by the 1st sea Lord on January, 10, 1934 was about discussing size in expecation of the 1935 naval conference. Switzerland proposed to limit tonnage to a mere 25,000/22,000 tonnes with 12 and 11 in respectively. Japan though (as usual) it could pull up a battleship capped at 25K tons and yet proposed 14-in guns. For the sake of standardization, the US argued nothing less or more than 35K would do for them. Another gunnery revision came from the 13.5 in guns of the Frennch Dunkerque, based on 23,000 tonnes, which saw the 12-in jumping to 13-in.

The Germans also looked at a 25,000 tonnes design to replacer the Deutschland in reply to the French.
Admiral Bellair reported from Geneval he might obtain ffrom the US a capping to 28,000 tonnes and 12-in guns. And so the staff pressed the DNC to look at designs with between eight and ten 12-in guns with 23 kts, still considerable protection, better AA on a 28K displacement.

The 1934 12-in guns designs

Successively: Lenght (ft oa) x beam; shp; top speed; 12-in configuration; 6-in numbers; 4.7-in numbers; 0.5-in HMG numbers, TTs, belt armor mag/mach.; Deck armor mag/mach; standard displacement:
12N: 614 x 102 ft; 45K shp, 23kts; 4×2; 12; 4; 8; 2×5 TTs; 12.5/11.5; 5.5/3.5-in; 28,500 tons
12O: 614 x 102 ft; 45K shp, 23kts; 3×3; 12; 4; 8; 2×5 TTs; 12.5/11.5; 5.5/3.5-in; 28,130 tons
12P: 634 x 103.6 ft; 45K shp, 23.25kts; 2×2+2×3; 12; 4; 8; none; 12/11; 5/3-in; 28,500 tons
12Q: 634 x 103.6 ft; 45K shp, 23.25 kts; 4×3; 24; 4; 8; none; 12/11; 5/3-in; 28,500 tons
12R: 634 x 103.6 ft; 45K shp, 23 kts; 3×3; none; 24; 4; 8; 4×3 TT; 12.25/11.25; 5.5/3.5-in; 28,500 tons
12S: 634 x 103.6 ft; 45K shp, 23 kts; 3×3; none; 24; 4; 8; 4×3 TT; 12.25/11.25; 5.5/3.5-in; 28,500 tons
12T: 634 x 103.6 ft; 45K shp, 23 kts; 4×2; none; 24; 4; 8; 4×3 TT; 12.25/11.25; 5.5/3.5-in; 28,500 tons
It should be noted that all carried at least one aircraft, apart P and Q, the last three even having four. The 12R had 24 4.7 in dual purpose, but space was limited to have all these installed with an acceptable arc of fire, in addition to a lot of exposed crews, and this was objected by the naval staff. The triple mounts on either sides were surprising, as much as they belonged for cruisers, and combination with a hangar and transverse catapult complicated things even more.

The 1934 14-in guns design

The Americans objected and wanted to stick still with their standard, or as close at it as possible, and the British Naval staff proposed two variants for their acceptation, that can fit the bill also for the RN. Due to the gunnery upgrade on the same displacement, serious sacrifices were made. This was expressed on 10 October 1934, as primimany staff requirements:
Design A: 4×3 main, 24 sec. DP, same AA, still 3 TTs, 4 aircraft*, 14-in protection at 15K yds/90°, bomb at 10K ft, against plunging fire 28K Yds.
Design B: 3×3 main, 20 sec., same AA, no TTs, 2 aicraft and no hangar, same protection.
*It was precised two fighters and two recce/observation/spotting “TSR” models (the Swordfish).
This in turn generated via the DNC a set of five new designs called 14 TLA, TLB, TLA(x), TKA(y), 14Q.
14 TLA: 660 x 106ft, 46K shp, 23 Kts, 4×3, 24, 4+6 AA, 4TTs, 4 Air. on 34,000 tons
14 TLB: 600 x 105ft, 45K shp, 23 Kts, 3×3, 20, 4+6 AA, none, 2 Air. on 30,000 tons
14 TLA(x): 630 x 106ft, 35K shp, 21 Kts, 4×3, 24, 4+6 AA, none, 4 Air. on 32,500 tons
14 TKA(y): 650 x 106ft, 46K shp, 23 Kts, 4×3, 24, 4+6 AA, none, 4 Air. on 32,500 tons
14Q: 660 x 106ft, 45K shp, 23 Kts, 3×4, 24, 4+6 AA, 2×3 TTs, 4 Air. on 32,800 tons
The armour scheme for all included a 13-in thick main belt, 12.25 in over the machinery, 5 in over the magazine, 3.5 over the machinery (both vertical) for the all designs but 12.5-in, 11-in, 5 and 3-in for TLA(y).
The interesting point was the realization quadruple turrets could be a solution, with design 14Q. With three quad instead of triple turrets, the reduction of the armor was possible on a slightly heavier displacement, authorizing to beef up armor from 11 inches to 12.25 inches for the belt armor over machinery and 3.5 inches for its vertical protection as well.

1935 design studies and considerations

In the admiralty 113/4041 documentation, several points were observed. First the main armament weight in various configurations. By far the heaviest was the Nelson configuration in three triple 16 in (406 mm) with around 7,160 tonnes, compared to the lightest, 3×3 14-in (5,550) and the quad 14-in (356 mm) turret solutions comparing well at 6,750 tonnes to the three triple 15-in (381 mm), with the guns and turrets, but not the barbettes and wells.
It was considering the shattering effect of lower caliber guns on unprotected areas or the machinery was quite valuable, combined with a greater reload speed.
The factor of speed mattered little in the grand strategy, between the positions of bases and reconnaissance. It was estimated on this base that 27 knots was the most acceptable, rather than 30 kts.
The “decisive range school” went to argue that the greater punch and range of modern guns made all the more necessary to bolster armour thickness whent possible (a realization like for the US of long range gunnery primacy in future tactics). It was pitted against proponents of the “gun power school”, which wanted to devote more weight to larger guns, and less on armor or only on most critical areas. They saw Jutand reports about oblique fire being paramount on the QE class and they did better for protection in action than on the testing ground, which is under very controlled conditions unlike combat. This was very much the old Fisher credo of “hit them first”.
However soon the admiralty agreed than for any efficience, warships (especially in the north sea where visibility was poor, between absence of spotter aviation, fog, and smoke), 50,000 yards was rather the optimal distance for primary engagement. So gunnery range mattered less. Another argument was to solve the “decisive battle” the RN wanted to “force the decision” and for this go to contact instead of skirmishing at a distance. In 1934, neither ballistic computers or fire control systems had changed much since 1918. A completely different approach would have been needed in the Mediterranean.
five new designs called 14, 15 and 16 according to their main caliber (in inches). Dimensions were understood as 650-660 ft overall, 106 wide, on 35,000 tonnes (The anglo-German naval treaty was discussed in 1935). Speed follows here the caliber, and armor (belt, barbette, deck mag/mach.).
14C: 3×4; 30 kts; 11.5, 12 x 5/3.5 in
16A: 3×3; 30 kts; 11.5, 12 x 5/3.5 in
14E: 2×4 + 1×2; 30 kts; 12.5, 12 x 5.25/5.25 in
15A: 3×3, 30 kts, 12.5, 12 x 5.25/4.25 in
14F: 3×4; 27 kts; 12.5, 12 x 5.5/5 in
16C: 3×3; 27 kts; 11.5, 12 x 5.25/5.75 in
14D: 1×4 + 2×2; 30 kts; 13.5, 12 x 6.25/5.75 in
15B: 3×3; 27 kts; 13.5, 12 x 6/5.25 in
16B: 2×3 + 1×2; 27 kts; 13.5, 12 x 6/5.25 in
14J: 3×4; 28 kts; 13, 12 x 6/4.5 in
14K: 3×4; 29 kts; 12.5, 12 x 6/3.75 in
15C: 3×3; 29.5 kts; 14, 12 x 6.25/5 in
The 16C seemed favorites but still weak, armor wise.
In the end, it was decided that for a 30 kts ship, the 15-in variant was equal to the 16-in armour wise due to better protection, that the 27 kts ship the 15-in variant is again preferrable, even to stand against a 16-in ship. As for the 23 knots type, it seems hitting (and thus rate of fire) was again the most important factor, even though the overall armor was superior. In that case, the 16-in should have the advantage. It was also expected aviation would have a greater role and again, the protection of the 15-in ship variant seemed better placed. In the end also the 14-in and 15-in were about the same for “hit factor” anyway, statistically, better chances of a critical hit than a 16-in, depite the latter much greater hitting power.
By late 1935 it was decided to go for Nine 15-in guns, 29 knots, but three weeks later, twelve 14-in guns and 30 knots.

Consequences of the 1936 London Naval Treaty

Reduction hopes were shattered when Italy left treaties and decided to built two 35,000 tons capital ships with 15-in guns, the Littorio class. Immediately France and Germany jumped on the same bangwagon and Geneva’s distant hopes of limitations were definitively buried. Due to this on 20 September 1935, Sea Lords set their choice of nine 15-in guns and 29 kts to match. But soon it was realized that “battlecruisers” (in British parlance, in reality these were fast batteships past 28 kts) with 15-in guns would be needed to face Japan’s 16-in armed Nagato class, and it was discussed how to set instead a standard of 15-in whatever the type for all theaters.
It was also assumed that Japan would go for smaller calibers to answer initial US researches for the North Carolinas and their dreadnought standard, which never happened. At 35,000 tonnes a 16-in armed fast battleship would have to make armor concessions as shown by 16A, B, C.
Among other decisions following this and the apparent choice of three quad 14-in guns turrets, was to raise the armored deck of one level.

In October 1935, decision was made to use 14-inch guns while negotiating for a continuation of the Naval Treaties, the Government still favouring, hoping for a reduction in maximum caliber to 14 but ultimately learning that that the United States would only support them if the were persuaded to follow -which was a vain hope given the militaristic, ultranationalistic nature of the regime by then).

An artillery choice based on emergency

The admiralty could not wait answers from the Japanese authorities, which in turn prevented any position of the US, and since the large naval guns needed to be ordered by the end of the year to be ready for installation anyway (a new gun model was needed, requiring at least three years of development), the British Admiralty decided on 14-inch guns for the upcoming King George V class. The Second London Naval Treaty, signed at the end of the Second London Naval Conference (December 1935-March 1936) was signed by the US, France and Britain only (Japan and Italy retired, Germany and USSR were out anyway), and together indeed, set a main battery with 14-inch naval guns as limit. But it was nothing more than a waterbubble:
As soon as the Littorio class was announced by Mussolini indeed, France decided for a new design (The Richelieu) with same 15-in (381 mm) caliber guns, as did the Germans (Bismarck), while the US, to answer IJN battleships with 16-in guns and fearing a new design using the same or more, decided to stick with 16-in for the Washington class.
Meanwhile, Britain was stuck with a 35,000 tonnes, 27 kts battleship armed in theory with quadruple turrets with the newly developed 14-in guns…

The choice of 14P and primacy of armour

King Georges V as built

The raisoning of the armored deck raised to the middle deck generated three more designs: 14N, 14O and 14P, the latter being the final one chosen. All three differed in many aspects.
14N: 12×14-in, 20×4.5-in, 4×4 pompom, 4×4 Vickers HMG, 100,000 shp, 14-in lower belt mag., 13-in lower belt mach., 6 and 5 in decks, middle armor deck level, on 35K tons.
14O: same, 16×2.25-in, same, 110,000 shp, 13-in upper, 14-in lower belt mag., 12-in upper, 13-in lower belt mach., 5.5 and 4.5-in decks, Main armor deck level, on 35,450 tons.
14P: 10×14-in, 16×2.25-in, same, 110,000 shp, 15-in upper, 15-in lower belt mag., 14-in upper, 14-in lower belt mach., 6 and 5-in decks, Main armor deck level, on 35,500 tons.
So 14P presented a much better armor for the sacrifice of a quad turret, swapped for a twin one, and slight tonnage increase. This was chosen for the King George V class as laid down.
This increase of armor was supposed to allow the ship to operate when and where required, even under strong attack, security against shell fire until decisive range of below 16,000 yds was reached,
and still the rate of fire and firepower scale needed to deal with foreign 15-in designs, primacy of European waters as main threaters of operations with focus of greater chances of air attacks and thus, great confidence given into the new 5.25-in caliber in development (we know how it ended).

Thus by that stage in 1936, requirements of armour became paramount. The delay of completion was pushed back realistically to spring 1940 at this point, which was less vital if peacetime was maintained, which became a prime objective for both French and British Gvts. at that point or rising tensions (the appeasement policy). There were concerns about the completion of the Bismarck class, and it was estimated it would take until late 1942 for the Kriegsmarine to have five potent battleships. In addition still, global strategy mattered more than ship-to-ship comparisons. Having the best design (protection wise) however mattered more than delays at this point for the admiralty. Indeed, it was always possible in the future to improve main gunnery, AA strenght, improve fire control and detection, but not armour which was “fixed” for decades (apart perhaps additional blisters or easy add-on plating when possible).

In the end, the irony of all this was no nation was ready after the end of the treaties’s vacancy was ready when WW2 broke out. Neither the Royal Navy, caught pants down why building the KGV class, or the Germans with the Bismarck class, the French with the Richelieu class, the US with the North Carolinas class and so on.
It is also interesting to note that the North Carolinas were -as per the London treaty in 1936- at first were designed with three quadruple turrets with 14-in guns, exactly like the KGV. But they diverged in armor with their external belt one deck below, overall they looked very similar, but of course a last minute change swapped to triple 16-in, while the rest same about the rest. The British still had the possibility of a “swap” later, but they new they would need a larger ship, which would become the Lion class. But on the KGV it would need to make sacrifices. There was just less time as compared to the North Carolinas. No more delays was the order of the day.

Construction

Construction of the first two KGV class battleships was voted and the first two ships authorized and ordered on 29 July 1936.
HMS King George V was assigned to basin N°10 in Vickers-Armstrong Yard, on the Tyne. She was laid down on a symbolic first january 1937, launched on 21.2.1939 and completed on 11.12.1940 at a cost of £7,393,134. It would be the equivalent of £489,127,794.22 today, adjusted for inflation. src
HMS Prince of Wales was assigned to Cammell Laird, Birkenhead, laid down at the same time of her sister ship, on 1.1.1937 but launched later on 3.5.1939 and completed almost four months later on 31.3.1941, having an intense, but short career and only one sunk.
HMS Duke of York was the ex-Anson, renamed after being ordered, to John Brown, Clydebank a bit later compared to the others, laid down on 5.5.1937. She was launched on 28.2.1940 but still completed on 4.11.1941, having a less intense, but still valued career compared to the others, completed with a battle victory.
HMS Anson (ex-Jellicoe) ordered to Swan Hunter, Wallsend and laid down on 20.7.1937 was almost suspended when WW2 borke out. Work resumed until her launch on 24.2.1940 but she took more than two years before completion on 22.6.1942.
As for HMS Howe (ex-Beatty) she was laid down at Fairfield, Govan on 1.6.1937, same batch as her sister Anson but launched later on 9.4.1940 and completed just two months later at 29.8.1942.
The general public retains the name of the first three but generally forgets about the last two. Their late completion meant most bet assets of the German surface fleet were no longer a threat apart the confined Tirpitz, the Kriegsmarine swapping on U-Boat warfare at this point. Their career was certainly less appealing than the others.

Design of the King George V class Battleships

Powerplant

The compartmentalisation of their engine room saw boilers and machines grouped in pairs to prevent a single shot paralyzing all propulsion. Nominal output was 110,000 horsepower at 230 rpm. Steam was injected into the tubes at 371-5°C.

Specs in short:

-Four steam turbine rooms, four boiler rooms, eight machinery compartments total alternating in pairs.
-Each pair of boiler rooms was paired with engine rooms.
-Nominal output: 110,000 shaft horsepower (82,000 kW)
-Working pressure: 400 Ib /sq. inch (28 kg/cm2; 2,800 kPa) exiting at 700 °F (371 °C).
-It was also designed to operate with overload or “boost” mode up to 125,000 shp (93,000 kW)
-HMS Prince of Wales main machinery could even reach 128,000-134,000 shp and showed this during the hunt for Bismarck.

Boilers Issues

The eight Admiralty 3-drum boilers paired for each turbine operated very efficiently. They inherited a long-standing and very efficient design from the interwar, that, when fitted to older dreadnoughts, such as the rebuilt HMS battleship Warspite during her 1937 reconstruction showed a 0.748 lb per shp on trials.
Sea trials for the lead ship King George V on 10 December 1940 showed an output of 111,700 shp at 230 rpm based on a 41,630 long tons displacement. Specific fuel consumption was 0.715 lb per shp.

The problem emerged after 1942, when the Royal Navy was forced to use fuel oils due to shortages, with considerably higher viscosity and greater seawater content. Poor quality, plus seawater contamination drastically reduced the boilers efficiency and complicated maintenance; Indeed by 1944 the efficiency was now up to 0.8 lb per shp. The Admiralty in between urged the adoption of new types of oil sprayers and burners to regain some efficiently, which were installed on HMS Duke of York and Anson, managuing to regain this full efficiency. The same installation was used on HMS Vanguard, which in fact having in addition the benefit of peacetime, better quality fuel oil reach an eficiency as far as 0.63 lb per shp based on the very same steam pressures and temperatures.

Armor protection

HD protection Details of the King George V, midship section

The armor protection compared to the Nelson class had made a long “trip” and was revised and expanded to less vital parts of the ship, no longer applying as said above the “all or nothing” scheme.
In 1934-36 were studied options, notably comparing the sloped armour and sandwich bulge options, and vertical armor advantages and same bulge. ASW protection main principles were accepted quickly and included, on a 106 to 102 feet beam, the same structure underwater, with an air void, followed by a water jacket, and then another air space, but in the first case, the main 13-in armour was sloped downwards to deflect incoming high angle shells, and internal walls followed the same angles slope the armour being internal with a 10-8-6 in thick external hull from above the waterline.

The vertical armor scheme had the main extrernal flat armor, 14-in thick, resting on the same sandwich, but the armor deck was flat above both the air void and water jacket, and then sloped on about a full deck height until meeting the bottom of the main belt in a sloping manner. Even in that case, the main armor was a sandwich of 10 and 9.6-in above and below the waterline, backed by the main 14-in plate. The main point about these designs compared to the Nelsons was that modern shells, as shown in several tests, can dive underwater, and thus bypass old style “high-up” vertical armor schemes. Underwater armor had to be cared for. This orientation was done as early as October 1933.

General armor scheme src

The greatest changes in armour layout from 1933, Option B (vertical armor) was of course the raising of the armored deck to the main deck, its key feature, instead of the middle deck.
Note:
-The upper deck was the weather deck
-The Main deck was the first internal deck below
-The middle deck was a utilitarian level below, both traversed by barbettes
-The lower deck was the last deck above the machinery.
Thus, the “raft” created by the citadel moved one step above with a downards sloped 1-in upper deck hull side, followed by a 15-14-in main belt armor, external, tapered down to 5.5-4.5-in below the waterline. The main armor deck (at main deck level) was inbcreased to 5-6-in and the internal ASW sandwich was lower, starting below the waterline level. The middle water jacket was now filled with oil optionally and there was no longer a second oil filled internal compartment next to the machinery longitudinal bulkhead. The larger volume in the citadel created by this choice in turn added more buoyancy in case of flooding. Indeed, in case the ship was flooded badly, the hope was the main armour deck to stay as much as possible well above the waterline still, especially in case of aerial bomb blast. It was estimated in 1936 that any new SAP bomb would have a greater distance to travel before hitting any vitals.

In all previous designs, armour figured revolved around two main armour schemes:
-Belt armour (vertical protection) over the machinery and ammunition magazines, which both were the most vital parts of the ships
-Deck armour (Horizontal protection) over the same locations. For the latter especially, every inch or even half-inch increase due to the much larger area to cover meant hundreds of additional tons.
-The protection of machines benefited most attention, since if the ship lost power, it lost also all ways to control the artillery and FCS in addition of being a sitting duck. The belt was widened downwards, while internal subdivision and central armored caissons were lengthened considerably. Nevertheless, deck protection against aerial bombs remained largely sufficient due to weight sacrifices to stay withing the 35,000 tonnes limit.
The turret armor was lowered in thickness a bit, less the barbettes and wells, whereas ammunition bunkers benefited on the contrary the greater increase, while being better distributed. To achive acceptable stability, the rather large superstrcuture, a development of the Warspite/QE/Revenge “queen ann’s mansion” design was considerably lightened despite the bulky appareance, and the roof protection only reached 100 mm. In practice, officers always favored overall visibility to the protected containment of the conning tower.

Horizontal Protection:

Details of the armored belt, near HMS Howe B Turret, Sydney 1944
Postwar studies showed that the new delayed-action AP shells could in fact dive under a shallow belt and thus penetrate vital areas. Engineers were asked to majke the main belt as deep as poissible below the waterline as a result. The belt started forward of the N°1 turret and ended aft of N°3 turret, a very common scheme but composed of three equal-depth strakes, tongue-and-grooved together. Each individual plate was keyed into neighbouring plates for added strenght. Of course all was made in high tensile steel to the best standard. This was essentially for the strongest part (close to the magazines) made in cemented armour, laminated onto 1 in “composition material” stuck to a surface of 0.875 inch (22.2 mm) Ducol steel hull plating. British cemented armour which provided excellent resistance and reinforced the admiralty into believing the relatively low thickness was deceptive.

-Main armour belt 23.5 feet (7.2 m) high, from main armoured deck to 15 feet (4.6 m) below waterline.
-Main armour belt, waterline 14-15 inches
-Main belt along the magazines 14.7 inches thick (373 mm)
-Main belt along the machinery spaces 13.7 inches (349 mm).
-Belt, Lower section 4.5-5.5 in.
-Armoured citadel forward armoured bulkhead: 12 in (305 mm) thick
-Armoured citadel aft armoured bulkhead: 10 in (254 mm) thick
-Main armoured belt past bulkheads 13-5.5 inches.
Immune zone calculations was setuop to resist greater caliber, about 15 and 16-in shells, and only exceeded by the Yamato-class. It was in fact far better than the main caliber could have suggested. The KGV were nowhere near as “weak” as sometimes portrayed given the armour thickness reading alone.

Vertical Protection:

KG V Armor scheme

It was three layered for a combined 9.13 in (232 mm):
-Weather deck 1.25 inches thick with Ducol (D) steel
-Main armoured deck below (one deck higher as decided in 1935) 5.88 in (149 mm) in non-cemented steel + 0.5-inch D steel deck
-Ammunition magazines had a 1.5-inch splinter deck
-Powder magazines were below the shell rooms (borrowed to the Nelson-class battleships design)
-Machinery spaces had the main armoured deck 4.88 in (124 mm) + 0.5-inch D steel deck
-Main armoured deck, forward of the main armoured bulkhead: to 2.5 inches
-Main armored deck past the after magazines: 4.5–5 inches turtleback also covering the waterline.

Main Turrets protection:

-Main gun turrets 12.75 inches (16 in for the Nelson class) for the frontal arc.
-Turret faces 12.75 in (324 mm)
-Turret sides 8.84 inches (225 mm) and gun chamber
-Rea sides and back plate: 6.86 inches (284–174 mm)
-Roof plating 5.88 in (149 mm) thick.
-Main barbettes 12.75 in (324 mm) over weather deck
-Reduction one deck deep to 11.76 in (298 mm) forward, 10.82 in (275 mm) aft.
Notes:
> The higher quality of the armour minimized this protection reduction.
> Design-wise the sloped face improved ballistic resistance at long ranges, and low profile at closer ranges.
> Reduction in turret and barbette armour was returned in favor to increased magazine protection
> Extensive anti-flash protection in the turrets and barbettes designed to prevent any communication to the magazines.

Secondary Turrets protection and Conning Tower

Secondary gun mounts, with their turrets, casements and handling rooms were only protected by 0.98 in (25 mm), just sufficient against splinters.
Unlike other battleships of their time (The US would reach the conclusion they coukd get rid of CTs altogether later) the King George V class had a light conning tower, with walls just 4-inch (102 mm) facing forward, unequal thickness of 3 in (75 mm) on the sides and aft and topped by a 1.47 in (38 mm) roof. Analysis of WWI actions indeed pointed out command personnel preferred superior visibility. So the CT became an “imrobable backup”, some kind of insurancy born from naval combat forms where distance was shorter and accuracy poorer. This in addition solved Stability and weight issues. It was only valued for its protection against moderately large shell fragments.

Underwater protection

Development

The design development of the unerwater protection is also an interesting topic, especially because ot was all-internal, but still narrower than contemporary designs, especially compared for example to the Litorrio class Pugliese system, or the one chosen on the Yamato class. All in al, engineers managed, thanks to the new, higher main protective deck, to create a more compact three-layered system over just 14 feets (4.26 m) but it benefited from live tests in full scale, proving itself. Torpedo bulkhead ranged from 1.5 to 1.75 inches (38 – 40 mm).
Further internally the machinery was divided into eight modules in roughly the center of the ship, with the two B and A outer engine rooms further apart and separated by two harbour machinery rooms, thus closer to the bulkheads, a potential weak point. X and Y machinery spaces were actually further aft than their own boiler rooms, all inline unlike A-B ones. The rest of the “central trench” protected on both sides, fore and aft of the machinery, itself surrounded by auxiliary machinery rooms and diesels, were located the ammo magazines eight aft for the Y turret (plus a ninth in front of the barbette) and 5.25 in aft turrets, and forward, four 5.25 in mags., and four main ammo mags. installed alongside the A and B barbettes. There was also a double bottom 4 feet deep running all along the ship, but after the underwater sandwich, below the machinery spaces.

Below the waterline, engineers devised the side protection system (SPS):
The principle was a Subdivivision into a series of longitudinal compartments with the void middle ones filled by liquid (like additional oil), outer and inner compartments filled with air.
-The Outer hull plating was thin, to just stop torpedo initial splinter damage.
-Outer void or air filled compartment allowed the initial explosion to expand, 13 feet wide.
-Middle compartment filled with oil/seawater spread the pressure pulse and contained splinters.
-Inboard compartment contain liquid leaking and remaining pressure.
See also

The main armoured bulkhead behind this STS ranged from 1.5 in (37 mm) (machinery spaces) to 1.75 inch (44 mm) (magazines). This bulkhead was designed to resist residual blast pressure. If penetrated, subdivided compartments behind would contain any leaks. Further inwards, relatively small compartments contained the auxiliary machinery spaces with around 8 feet more of space until reaching the major machinery spaces own walls. A and B Engine Rooms however missed the auxiliary machinery spaces, replaced by a narrowed void space.

Above all this, and in contact with the lower armour belt, new compartments used for washrooms or storage favored upward venting of overpressure.
All this was tailored to damp and resist a 1000 lb warhead effect. This sandwich was built into a whole section and tested while plunged in water. It was found effective and validated. Any lists from flooding in addition could be compensated by easy counterflooding in opposite empty void spaces or just pumping out liquid filled compartments, if the pumps were workable and not disabled.

Protection case: HMS Prince of Wales

The only battleship of this class, and one of the rare British battleships which was sunk in WW2 (With HMS Royal Oak and Barham) is an intersting case that fuelled debates after the war, between historians and not the admiralty as the cold war condemned the battleship as a viable type. HMS Prince of Wales was indeed sunk on 10 December 1941, from -as believed- six Japanese aerial torpedoes, and a 500 kg bomb.

The extensive 2007 survey by divers on her wreck helped to solve large parts of the mystery. They determined four torpedo hits, not six, and that three of these struck the hull outside the area protected by the SPS. The fourth one hit the SPS holding bulkhead, which looked intact abreast close to the hit. As shown in a 2009 report, primary cause was something engineers would have perhaps not expected: Uncontained flooding along “B” propeller shaft had its external shaft bracket failing, sending the rapidly spinning, enormous shaft tearing up the bulkheads. And this was all the way from the external shaft gland, up to B Engine Room, which was flooded, condemning the primary machinery spaces.

This was aggravated by apparently poor damage control with premature abandonment of the after magazines and telephone communications switchboard which would have allowed last minute measures. “B” propeller shaft stopped was nevertheless restarted, causing much damage without knowledge of the true extent of it. At the time in early 1942, several design improvements were recommended to the other four battleship, such as a better watertight ventilation system, redesigned internal passageways (in machinery spaces) and a more resilient internal communications system.
It was decided to improve propeller shaft glands and a locking gear to avoid a loosening shaft to cause damage.
Supposed failures were predicated by engineers though if the hit was done on frame 206 on B propeller shaft. The 2007 survey was however fustrated by several reasons and incomplete, fuelling more theories afterwards.

It was also nor predicted in the damage report after POW’s encounter with Bismarck and Prinz Eugen. Three hits caused a flooding by 400 tons of water, and one crucially, penetrated the torpedo protection outer bulkhead close to the auxiliary machinery space. The inner D-steel holding bulkhead remained intact since, crucially, this shell was a dud. Although inconclusive, the majority believed the STS was a safe system which would play its role in nearly any scenario.

The main question is: Did the PoW suffered important shortcomings in her underwater or armor deck protection causing her demise when attacked by IJN aviation on 10 December 1941 ?
Above the question of “passive” protection of course everyone had its own opinion on the “active” protection layer, of course the AA, which in her case was not “upgraded” with scores of 20 and 40 mm US pattern guns. Still “in her juice” when sent to Force H she carried her original sixteen 5.25 in secondary turrets and Pompoms. Captain Leach was not to blame for his dodging skills, neither the crews and she put a fierce AA defence that day despite an overwhelming opposition. Even when the last bomber squadron (Takeda Sqn.) arrived for the coup de grace, when the battleships was reduced to 6 knot and sinking, PoW still hit five out of his eight bombers.

As for the supposed “rubbish” ASW defence, it took four near-simultaneous torpedo hits on the first wave to damage her seriously on the first pass, plus a bomb hit. The torpedo bulkhead held the first three, but one lucky hit struck close to the outer shaft, which in turn created the most initial damage. This was the sole source of flooding and almost totally unexpected, to put on the same level as the very unlikely hit that exploded the Hood. Counterflooding was used also and the scale of the attack was in any case beyond what the ship was designed to sustain. The biggest issue were repeated attacks that prevented damage control after this first one and the fact that hald her power was gone (along with electrical wiring) early on, negating the use of AA and FCS early on in this engagement. She therefore never had the chance to show what she could do. In fact few designs could have survived that amount of punishment, but perhaps Yamato and Musashi, but they were of another scale entirely.

Armament

The main armament, initially of three triple turrets and 15-in guns was down to 14-in (356 mm) due political pressures after the London Treaty forced and the use of quadruple turrets instead of triples only possible with such caliber, enabled more guns to bear, a total of twelve guns instead of nine, and of a new moderl, hopefully with longer range and better accuracy but, most importantly, greater rate of fire. A completely different philosophy compared to the WWI 15-in guns (381 mm), born from the assumption range would be lower and fire volume mattered more than hitting power.
The admiralty realized with horror the direction taken by other navies in 1936 but the adaptation of 16-in guns would trigger such delays they would have jeopardize the entry into active service the lead ship, perhaps (according to modern calculations) as far as early 1941. The quadruple turrets were an entirely new design and a risky proposition which translated into many teething problems at the start of the war. The events of May 1941 showed this in particular, combind with “light shells” proved almost fatal to the POW.
As completed, the lead ship, King George V had two 14-in or 356mm/45 BL Mk VII in turrets Mark III and a single twin 356mm/45 BL Mk VII in turret Mark II, eight twin 133mm/50 QF Mk I DP guns, four Octuple 40mm/39 2pdr QF Mk VIII Pompom (later extended to eight), and four 20-tubes 178mm UP rockets projectors. There was none of the planned Vickers 0.5 in quad HMGs, and they were not installed later. AA reinforcement came in 1941 onwards.

Main BL 14-inch/45 Mk VII naval gun Battery

Genesis of the 14-in guns

When the caliber was solidified in 1936, design started right away and officially on its way in early 1937, and were the first 14 inch (35.6 cm) guns exclusively designed and accepted into service by the Royal Navy, the previous ones indeed of earlier Marks being manufactured “as private ventures” for foreign-ordered battleships, requisitioned when WWI broke out. So this new generation started almost with the blank page.

High-velocity heavy gun had been cast aside after many issues encountered with the 16″/45 (40.6 cm) Mark I (Nelson class) and the new Mark VII was a lower velocity gun, closer to the 14″/45 (35.6 cm) Mark I from HMS Canada/Latorre. It was based on the generally considered excellent but experimental 12″/50 (30.5 cm) Mark XIV completed in August 1933 testing “all steel” construction techniques and thus, the body used no wire but rather a radial-expansion construction. This made for no extra material and a strongeryet lighter gun, which was in the end more accurate and with a much greater barrel life than the Nelson’s 16″/45. Mountings however proved much more complex than anticipated mostly due to the internal space available in quad turrets, and were plagued with issues, corrected by 1943. On the total manufactured, an extra two of these Mark VII ended in a coastal artillery at Dover, supplied with a supercharge. In theory thay could land shells on opposite fortifications near Calais.

These guns were caracterized by an inner and main A tubes, plus a ractalngular jacket breech ring and its bush, shrunk collar over the tube. Reload used a Welin breech block with hydraulic Asbury mechanism, all proven solutions. Trials retured two of the 78 guns made, 24 by Royal Gun Factory, 39 by Vickers-Armstrong, Elswick, 15 by Beardmore to ensure spares. The entire class consumed indeed 50 guns (five battleships, with ten each) so there were less spares than the maximum for a single replacement. The last 46 produced had a modified breech ring with a 12.5 ton (12.7 mt) counterweight. There was a projected Mark VII* loose barrel paper project also.
They innovated by their recoil in a cast steel cradle and not on slides, something picked from the 12″/50 (30.5 cm) Mark XIV. The latter by the way was intended for the “Geneva Battleships”, if the attempt at limiting guns to this caliber had been signed in 1930.

Specifications

These guns weight 79.588 tons (later 78.988 tons) for a 651 in (16.532 m) barrel (later 630) with a rifling lenght of 515.7 in (13.098 m), 72 grooves 0.117 in deep x 0.3665 (2.97 x 9.309 mm), RH 1 twist and 22,000 in3 chamber volume.
Ammunition: Bag charge type.
APC Mark VIIB: APC: 61.6 in long, 1,590 lbs. (721 kg), 39.8 lbs. (18.1 kg) charge
HE: 156.5 cm long, 1,590 lbs. (721 kg), 107 lbs. (48.5 kg) charge
Propellant Charge: 338.3 lbs. (153.4 kg) SC 300
Approximate Barrel Life: 340 rounds
Ammunition stowage: 100 rounds
Mk II Twin Turrets: 915 tons, -3/+40 degrees at 8°/s. recoil 45 in, loading angle +5°
Mark III Quad turrets: 1,582 tons and same specs.
Note: 135/+135° training for “B” (twin) and “X” (aft quad) turrets, -143/+143° for “A” fwd quad, at 2°/s.

Performances of the 14-in guns

Muzzle Velocity: 2,483 fps (757 mps), at a working Pressure of 20.5 tons/in2 (3,230 kg/cm2)
Rate Of Fire: 2 rounds per minute
Min Range 2.5 degrees: 5,000 yards (4,570 m) at 2,160 fps (658 mps) 2.8° fall
Max Range 40 degrees: 38,560 yards (35,260 m) at 1,523 fps (464 mps) and circa 50.5° fall
Time of flight: up to 57.4 seconds at 30,000 yards
AP penetration figures: point blank: 26.9″ (668 mm) or armor, down to 9.5″ (241 mm) belt and 4.00″ (102 mm) deck at 25,000 Yards
Optimal penetration at 16,000 Yds: 13.2″ (335 mm) or 13.0″ (330 mm) belt and 1.95″ (50 mm) deck armor depending on sources.
More

The KGV guns were not the most inefficient of the “pack” (Bismarck, Littorio, Richelieu, North Carolina), managing with the least caliber and lighter shell weight of 1,590 Ibs, but greatest bursting charge of 48.5 Ibs (48.3 for Richelieu), it did better than North Carolina for belt penetration at 16,000 Yards, were the second best for deck penetration at 26,000 yards, and thanks to ten guns, still had a sizeable broadside of 15,900 Ibs, better than the Richelieu or Bismarck.

Controversial “quad” Battle performances

HMS Anson in the north sea 1942, in firing drills, fwd turret at max elevation

There was much criticism about the artillery choice, especially with the hindsight of how things went during the war. Wether it was the disposition, in quad turrets, weight and speed of the shells, rate of fire, reloading time and issues.
When Prince of Wales (PoW) was pitted against Bismarck in May 1941, during her first “pass”, she had 55 out of 74 shells fired (74% success) out, 85% for the second, and 83% for the third, having fired 101 shells out of 128 or 79%. The remainder being loading issues from various causes. King George V (KGV) later was faultless for the first 32 min. and then had the output down to 20% but managed to fire 339 shells in 90 minutes nonetheless. Duke of York (DoY) when pitted against Scharnhorst benefited from nay adjustments and had 66% output, 91% with the first broadside, 446 shells fired in two hours of hot pursuit in bad weather. It seems indeed the twin turret did better with an average of 90% output.

Problems analysed were most acute with PoW, when she helled over to dodge a broadside, when the shell ring rammers foulied the brackets on the hinge trays on he interlock, and ramming was no longer possible until bearing was changed. There was no ramming problem/bearing on Y turret however. The problem was that with the ship’s motion and gravity effects, the shell tended to severely buckle the hinge tray, and thus damaging the revolving shell ring. It was quite a serious problem, which took time to resolve, specially given the absence of spare hinge trays !
It was also attributed to the the failure of the bridge tube flash doors, not locking fully, collapse of shell arresters (central ammo hoists) or small handling mishaps due to the lack of drills, and issues caused by the gunloading hoist control valves were never adjusted as intended by the engineers, and not corrected in drills yet.

The regrettable fact is these issues were learned “on the fly” famously during the Bismarck chase, and although well known for PoW, with civilian workers since on board, they were quite present still for the KGV as well. The DoY still had minor issues even after three years of refinements and modifications. In 1942, all corrections had been done, and gunnery drills reached 96.1% successes so for the admiralty the quad turrets were now “thoroughly reliable”. In fact, the battle of the North Cape report praised the gunnery as “very satisfactory on the whole”, notably because of the better mastery of the gunners thanks to previous drills, to prevent problems or cure them in action.

The main issues were around the shell arresters, which repeatedly failed when the ramming was done precisely when the ship underwent a sudden move into the swell. If passing the arresters, a shell could jam the whole system and 15 min. necessary to correct the issue, crucial in battle. The redundancy of ten guns was compensating, but still. The North Cape performance was no small feat nevertheless, in part due to the no-flash system related to the shell hoists had very narrow tolerances which were seriously tested when the ship flexed and twisted in swells, just enough to cause minor snaps and jammings. By the book, technical tolerance was below one inch (2.54 cm).

Dual Purpose secondary artillery

KG V secondary turret
KGV’s secondary artillery was as innovative as the rest of the ship, but it ran into multiple development problems, covered already by the Dido class cruisers study. It was planned to equip all subsequent RN vessel in place of the old 6-in (152 mm) and be versatile to provide long-range AA or deal equally against new generations of motor torbo boats. These compromises led to a disaster in application: In practice they were too slow for effective air defense and too weak to fight off destroyers or more so, engage cruisers while the main battery was reloading. The complexity of the reloading system, shells weight and intensive maintenance produced not the expected 10-12 rpm but in practice rather 7-8 with well trained crews and in the best conditions. They explained in part the POW’s failure to defend herself well in December 1941.

AA artillery (light)

When HMS Anson and Howe were completed, they had six octuple 40mm/39 2pdr QF Mk VIII pompom as well as 18 single 20mm/70 Oerlikon Mk II/IV guns.
The light anti-aircraft defense comprised the usual 40 mm quadruple QF (“pom-pom”) mounts planned already in 1933, and quad Vickers 0.5 in HMGs also planned in 1933 but latter dropped. Both had surface potential for more and in the course of the war, they received 20 mm Oerlikon and 40 mm Bofors, doubling until 1945. On HMS Anson this amounted to 65 x 20 mm and no less than… 216 x 40 mm in various mounts between the octuple and quad Pompom and Bofors, plus single Bofors for some and twin 20 mm mounts. Extra additions went on until 1949. This made them about the best protected battleships in WW2, let down however by the low performance of their 5.25 in DP guns, paling in comparison to the excellent USN standard 6-in/38 twin mount. At some points there were even discussion to replace with these, but the operation would just have been too complex due to their internal ammo supply.

QF 2-pdr

The basic design always included the trusted QF 2-pounder naval gun, of the Mk.VIII when the ships were completed, all in octuple mounts. The four mounts at first were located in upper position yet still close to the secondary batteries below, around the central “island” defined by the split superstructures forward and aft of the transverse catapults. This way, they had a good arc of fire and presented 32, and later 64 barrels in all when four more were added, with 32 barrels covering each side of the ship. This was only the start as they would earn durig WW2 smaller quad pompom mounts and Bofors, with a total almost reaching 200 barrels in 1945.
These QF 2-pdr Mark VIII fired a 1.6 in 40×158mmR shell at 115 rpm and 732 m/s (2,400 ft/s) to 3,960 m (13,300 ft) for the ceiling and theoretical 6,220 m (6,800 yd).
It needed a crew of five, including two loaders passing 14-round steel-link belt.

20-tubes UP AA Mk.I RL

This oddity replaced the initially planned quad Vickers HMGs and were a first on any British Battleships. On 14 November 1939, as First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill in his first memo requested weekly reports on the rocket development programme. He wanted them on five battleships, and a pair on each of six cruisers plus the monitor HMS Erebus. By April 1940, 40 projectors were ready and started tests. They were fitted on HMS Nelson, Rodney turret’s, HMS Hood, and became mandatory on KGV class when completed, with one of “B”, and one on “Y” turrets. The UP AA Rocket Mark I were to supplement 2-pdr AA guns at close range.
These were 32 inches (81.3 cm) long, weighing 35 lbs. (15.9 kg) with a 3,000 feet (910 m) effectiove range and parachute sinking speed of 16 to 23 fps (5 to 7 mps). The 20-tube mounting weighed 4 tons and had a joint cabin, closed if needed for the operator. The idea was liked by Churchill as innovative but almost totally ineffective as the barrage took too long to establish and was easily avoided by fast aicraft. They were removed at the first occasion on the class.

Fire control

The main guns of the King George V-class ships were controlled via two director control towers:
-One sat top of the bridge superstructure
-One sat aft of the mainmast.
Each was equipped with 15 foot rangefinders.

The targeting data was passed onto an Admiralty Fire Control Table Mk IX. The latter was a pretty common system onboard capital ships and cruisers of the RN. The Admiralty Fire Control Table (A.F.C.T.) was an electromechanical analogue computer fire-control system. From the input data, it calculated instantly the correct elevation and deflection of the main armament on the fly, transmitted to the gunner director of each turret. The MK 1 was developed for the HMS Nelson and Rodney, the Queen Elizabeth class and rebuilt battlecruiser Renown had Mk VII tables, but the King George V class had the Mk IX. All succeeded the WWI mechanical Dreyer tables.
If both control towers had been disabled in battle, “A” and “Y” quad turrets had as backup their own internal 41 foot rangefinders. “B” twin turret had a corresponding backup 30 foot rangefinder.

Pompom Mark IV 2-pdr control directors on KGV.
King George V and Prince of Wales also had:
-Four HACS Mk IVGB directors for the 5.25-inch guns
-Six Mk IV pom-pom directors
All of the above featured Gyro Rate Unit for tachymetric fire control.
Duke of York and Howe had updated HACS Mk V directors and HMS Mk VI directors. In time, they were assisted by radar sets and became pretty accurate by late 1944, right in time for the Pacific Campaign.
As completed, these battleships also had radars:
King George V and Prince of Wales had the same early warning type 279 radar, cooupled with the type 284 radars
Duke of York as well as Anson and Howe being completed later, gained an upgraded suite comprising the type 281, type 273, type 284, plus four type 285 and six type 282 radars assisting their main, secondary and AA artillery. This was upgraded during sebsequent years in 1944-45 (see modifications)

Onboard aviation

Back in 1936 when first planned, it seems these battleships were to be equipped with the Fairey Seafox, just in service, but it appeared soon the larger but better overall Supermarine Walrus was found more useful during their construction and they were put into service with these ships at completion. There is no photo to corroborate the presence of the Seafox on any of these battleships.

The interesting fact, as shown in the photo above, was the use of D-III-H back-to-back opposed catapults, two lattice cranes for service, and two hangars in the forward island of the superstructure to house a single Walrus, wings folded each, making for four of them theoretical, with the others on catapults permanently, presumably covered by tarpaulins for water spray. But in reality it was reduced to just two for practical reasons.

There is also navypedia mentioning the Swordfish torpedo floatplane version. At least photos showed it was used on HMS Malaya: Indeed two special squadrons equipped with Swordfish floatplanes, Catapult Flights Nos. 701 and 702. were embarked aboard HMS Malaya in early 1940, assisting the carriers in the North Sea and Atlantic. Another flew over Taranto, and the one on HMS Warspite had a great role in the Second Battle of Narvik, spotting and helping sinking several German destroyers in the fjord. It seems to have been more common on cruisers, but no photos shows it onboard any KGV class battleships as far as i know.

Author’s profile of the Walus aboard KGV: 710 Sqn. “red Z”, P6567 with an interesting three tones camouflage

The photo leading to this profile

Interior of the hangar
The Walrus served until late 1944 to early 1945 before being removed, along with the catapults.

Further modifications

Between the KGV, completed in October 1940, and HMS Howe on 17 June 1942, consiferable modifications and improvements had been done, in light of reports from the May 1941 combat of KGV and PoW, but also the loss of KGV in December.
Namely:
-The protection of cable roots for the secondary guns moutings
-Duplicate power for the secondary mounts
-More watertight bulkheads on lower deck neck aft and in the crews wash places
-Blanking on some potential flooding entries like watertight doors, scuttles and ventilation openings
-New, more powerfum Pumping system and deployment of portable pumps plus better drills
-Side lining removed for better access and damage control
-Better isolation of valves
-Emergency battery lighting
-Better management of electrical wiring
-Sleeping accomodations moved from one deck up
-New provision room aft for better flooding control
-Better rudder
-Better isolation of mantles for main and secondary batteries

Electronics upgrades:

King George V got the type 271 radar in 1941, whereas PoW was equipped in May 1941 with four type 282 FCS radars, and four type 285 radars. After the chase of Bismarck in July she receceived also the type 271 radar, while KGV in December was fitted with five type 282 radars.
By mid-1942, King George V received four type 285 FCS radars and one year later HMS Anson was given the type 282 radar. By May 1944 HMS Howe which originally received a full set with the type 273, type 281, type 284 radarswas upgraded to the type 274, type 277, type 281B, with two type 282, type 285 and type 293 radars.
One month later, King George V was upgraded to a new set comprising the type 277, type 279B, 2x type 282, type 285, type 293 radars.
By March 1945, HMS Duke of York, completed originally with the type 273, type 281, and type 284 radars, received a new set with two type 274, one type 277, one type 281B, two type 282, and one type 293 radars, and at the same time Anson had seven FCS type 262 radars, two type 274, four type 275, and the type 277, 281B, 293 radars, but she was also the first to be fitted with the new type 651 ECM suite.
By December, the only change of KGV was the addition of two type 282 radars and a month later in January, she had the following suite: Type 274, type 277, type 279B, nine type 282, five type 285, and a single type 293 radar. Thus became a standard also on DoY and Anson but the first had for example instead eight type 282 FCS, and Anson seven type 262, but also the second ship to receive the type 651 ECM suite. Howe was the last to see her relectronics upgraded, also in January 1946, with the following set:
-One type 274
-One type 277
-One type 281B
-Eight type 282
-Five type 285
-One type 293 radar

Armament upgrades:

The Duke of York in 1945
By July 1941, Prince of Wales was the first to receive three 20mm 178 UP (AA rocket launchers) and two aditional octuple 40mm/39 2pdr QF Mk VIII Pompom.
By late 1941, King George V also received four AARLs, one additional octuple 40/39 2pdr QF Mk VIII, and a quadruple 40/39 2pdr QF Mk VIII, plus eighteen 20mm/70 Oerlikon Mk II/IV (the first to be provided these). Her sister ship received seven of these by December, they were not sufficient to stop the 10 December air attack.
In April 1942, Duke of York received eight 20/70 Oerlikon Mk II/IV and fourteen more in March 1943, while by May, KGV had twenty more and 22 for Anson and Howe by mid-1943.
In May 1944 Howe received only six extra oerlikons 20/70, having also her catapult and seaplanes removed, while undergoing a major uprgade with eventually two quad 40mm/56 Bofors Mk 1.2, two octuple 40mm/39 2pdr QF Mk VIII pompom and four twin 20mm/70 Oerlikon Mk II/IV added. The first to received Bofors.
This was followed in June by Duke of York woth two extra single and two twin 20mm/70 AA and in July for KGV, receiving her first quad Bofors 40mm/39 and twelve 20mm/70, her catapult and planes removed, and then two quad 40mm/56 Bofors Mk 1.2 added, keeping her three Octuple pompom but having six twin 20mm/70 Oerlikon Mk II/IV.

In March 1945 HMS Duke of York on turn had her catapult and planes landed, and from two quad 40mm/56 Bofors Mk 1.2, and two Pompom had six extra quad 40mm/39 2pdr QF Mk VIII added and six twin Oerlikon plus fifteen single. At the same time, Anson was given in two phases (with also removal of planes and catapults), two quad Bofors, two Pompom, then two extra quad Bofors, ten twin and 13 single Oerlikon, two more twin 20mm/70 and two quad Pompom added. Howe when the war ended in Sepember just received 34 Oerlikon guns, eighteen single 40mm/56 Bofors Mk 1.2, and six quad pompom Mk VIII.
After the war in 1946 the standard for AA was siw quad 40mm/60 Mk 2, eight octuple Pompom Mk VIA, eight twin oerlikon 20mm/70 Mk V and circa fifty single.
The very last additions were to have six single Bofors 40mm/60 Mk III added.

Conclusion: The King, the Lion and the Vanguard

The Lion class (58,000 tonnes FL) sporting three triple turrets with 16-in guns.
It must by said that with all the AA, radars and other additions, despite the removal of their aviation and catapults, and relatively low sheer of the hull (still with a better freeboard midship of 21 feets), they reached almost 46,000 tonnes in 1945 and plowed a lot in heavy weather, wet ships in winter. This low prow was from a requirement to fire at max depression which never happened in practice. In this regards, the Vanguard did better, with more flare and sheer to the bow. Anather critic regarded no the guns themselves, this has been seen in detail, but the main turrets.

Not the fact a twin was mixed with two quads, but the shape of these. The individual cradles allowed all four guns to elevate independently and fire was never completely simultaneous to avoid shell interference. However having slab-sided turrets with “only” 13-in armour seemed a vulnerability. The turrets were even flat at the front. However given the size of the gun cradles and already cramped interior it would have been quite a fit to have these turrets sloped, space was lacking simply put to fit larger barbettes.

The last point, rightly so, was their limited range, due to a total fuel tank capacity equal to the Littorios, and degradation of performances due more to degraded fuel rather than intrinsictly bad boilers or turbines. They could have taken onboard an extra 200 tons of fuel to at least not be ridiculous compared to the Bismarck, which had the better range overall thanks to her nature of long range commerce raider, whereas the KGV was more an “interceptor”. Although understandable in the European “confines”, this became a problem in the Pacific where they were redeployed or scheduled so in 1945.
Despite the shortcomings of her secondary battery, disposition was good, fire control was good, notably the ability to take on four targets at once and rapid swap to antiship fight if needed. Another point, more surprising, is the thinking given to aicraft management (until they were removed on 1944-45 thanks to new radars). The amidship transverse catapult was not an invention as much it was already in use on the rebuilt Warspite, and on the “Town” class cruisers. The placement of the hangars enabled all in all four planes to be managed, bringing a wide bubble of reconnaissance to the fleet and four spotting stations for the main artillery, at least on paper with good weather and no fighters around. The Lions class get rid of them however quite quickly during their final design.
Would the Lion would had been superior ? Based on their main battery of 16 in (406 mm) guns, certainly, both facing what was left of the Kriegsmarine and the IJN. Armour wise it was basically a repeat of the same scheme, and drawings shows a limited flare to the bow, so they would have been probably equally “wet”.

The HMS Vanguard, still most of it sharing DNA with the KGVs, but with oddly WWI-era (modernized) 16-in guns twin turrets.

Profiles

KGV as completed, with her factory-applied camouflage, October 1940 as commissioned.

HMS King Georges V in light grey livery, apparently in Scapa Flow, repainted, January 1941.

KGV in dark grey livery, late 1941

KGV admiralty intermediate camouflage, mid-1943

Prince of Wales with Force Z in December 1941

Duke of York, December 1943

HMS Howe in July 1944, Suez Canal

HMS Anson in March 1945

Links/sources

Sir Stafford Cripps, Churchill and Tovey on deck of KGV 11 October 1942 in Scapa

Books

Campbell, N. J. M. (1980). “Great Britain” in Conway’s all the world’s fighting ships 1922-1947
Kagero TD-7017 17 – The Battleship HMS King George V
Brown, David K. (2006). Nelson to Vanguard: Warship Design and Development 1923–1945. London: Chatham Publishing.
Campbell, John (1985). Naval Weapons of World War II. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press.
Friedman, Norman (2015). The British Battleship 1906–1946. Barnsley, UK: Seaforth Publishing.
Garzke, William H. Jr.; Dulin, Robert O. Jr. (1980). British, Soviet, French, and Dutch Battleships of World War II. Jane’s.
Johnston, Ian; Buxton, Ian (2013). The Battleship Builders: Constructing and Arming British Capital Ships. Barnsley, UK: Seaforth.
Layman, R. D.; McLaughlin, Stephen (1991). The Hybrid Warship: The Amalgamation of Big Guns and Aircraft. NIP
Raven, Alan; Roberts, John (1976). British Battleships of World War Two. Annapolis NIP
Breyer, Siegfried (1974) [1973]. Battleships and Battle Cruisers 1905–1970. Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co.
Brown, David K. (1995). The Design And Construction Of British Warships 1939–1945. NIP.
Brown, David K. (2000). Nelson to Vanguard: Warship Design and Development 1923-1945. Chatham Publishing.
Burt, R. A. (2012). British Battleships, 1919–1939 (2nd ed.). Annapolis NIP
Buxton, Ian & Johnston, Ian (2021). Battleship Duke of York: An Anatomy from Building to Breaking. Seaforth Publishing.
Chesneau, Roger. (2004). Ship Craft 2: King George V Class Battleships. London: Chatham Publishing.
Crompton, Samuel Willard (2004). Sinking of the Bismarck. Chelsea House.
Friedman, Norman. U.S. Battleships: An Illustrated Design History. NIP
Garzke, Dulin and Denlay (2009). Death of a Battleship. SNAME Marine Forensics Committee.
Kennedy, Ludovic (1974). Pursuit. New York City: The Viking Press.
Marriott, Leo (2004). Vital Guide Fighting Ships of World War II. Airlife Crowood Press.
Middlebrook, Martin & Mahoney, Patrick (1979). Battleship: The Sinking of the Prince Of Wales and the Repulse. Penguin History.
Miller, Nathan (1995). War at Sea. New York: Scribner.
Konstam, Angus (2009). British Battleships 1939–45 (1) Queen Elizabeth and Royal Sovereign Classes. Osprey New Vanguard. Vol. 154.
Rasor, Eugene L. (1998). The China-Burma-India Campaign, 1931–1945: Historiography and Annotated Bibliography. Greenwood Press.
Raven, Alan (1972). King George the Fifth Class Battleships. Bivouac Books.
Roberts, John (1983). “The Final Action: The Sinking of the Bismarck”. In Roberts, John (ed.). Warship. Vol. VII.
Rohwer, Jürgen (2005). Chronology of the War at Sea 1939–1945: The Naval History of World War Two (Third revised ed.). NIP
Roskill, Stephen (1976). Naval Policy Between Wars. Volume II: The Period of Reluctant Rearmament 1930–1939. London: Collins.
Stephen, Martin (1988). Sea Battles in Close-Up: World War 2. Annapolis NIP
Tarrant, V. E. (1991). King George V Class Battleships. London: Arms and Armour

Links

On navypedia.org
On smh-hq.org
(archive) Bismarck armour
rina.org.uk – Naval architects
navweaps.com underwater projectiles ballistics
hmshood.org.uk report on the loss of Hood
(archive.org) relative protection afforded by the armour of British and foreign capital ships and cruisers against gunfire from various calibres of guns
On naval-history.net
Note 1936 battleship-armament#S5CV0315P0_19360720_HOC_247
archive.org KGV class secondary battery
maritime.org on 14-in guns
USN Projectiles table
British 14-in on navweaps.com
British 5.25 in on navweaps.com
london-naval-treaty-bill-1936
On wikipedia.org for base ref

Videos

A Must see: Most nerdy points in the article are from a rather long and deep video by drachinfels hosting historian Matt Warwick

Guns blazing footage