U.S. Navy Today

Semper Fortis

The USN Today

This large new section is discussing the US Navy from the fall of USSR in 1991 to this day and age (2025), prospects until 2030+ and current challenges facing the international, geopolitical situation. It is clear that recent developments of the war in Ukraine, and stance of China in the South China Sea poses the Pentagon serious considerations for the future global status of the US, regardless of the administration, and this goes with the Navy assets and capabilities. There had been serious critics about the post-cold war USN procurement, with many programs raising considerable controversy, and serious cost overruns leading to cancellations.
The three examples here most symptomatic of the 1990-2000s decades are the Zumwalt class destroyers, perhaps too ambitious for their own good, and with sub programs massively over schedule and over budgets, gradual decrease in capabilities and extra delays. So far the Zumwalt class are now considered white elephants, and the initially generous program was curtailed to just three units, the third being not even fully operational.
The second controversial program is on the “lighter” side, as the Litoral Combat Ships of LCS divided into the Independence class (trimaran hull) and Freedom class (single hulls), probably the most famous of this post-cold war new doctrine of regional crisis and asymetric threats. Fukuyama’s “end of history” seemed confirmed with a claimed “victory” over USSR, a Soviet Navy down to the bone, and China still not a threat at this point.

The doctrine for these ships, initially thought as very modular and inexpensive, were clearly peacetime missions: Patrolling, port visits, anti-piracy, and partnership-building exercises and mostly shore or shallow waters operations when first planned in the 1990s. In 2010 both designs were authorized and built, but they encountered a lot of operational issues. It was notably denounced their lack of firepower and usefulness in the waters of the Middle East. With the rapid rise of the PLAN it was clear they were under-armed and already a new class of fully fledged high seas frigates, something no longer in the inventory since the OH perry, was planned, the future constellation class frigates.

But the latter recently experienced scores of construction delays, despite being built in the US on an existing design, the Italo-French FREMM.
In general, if the programs (Batch IV-V Burke, Virginia class, Columbian class submarines) proceeded according to plans, there has been great concerns about the state of US shipbuilding in general. Post Cold War budget cuts saw a number of cancelled orders and slowing down of all programs, and now that the USN is ramping up again, construction rates could not keep up with the demand created by the gradual decommission of the “legacy” Cold War fleet, such as the Ticonderoga class cruisers and some of the Nimitz class carriers, bedrock of the USN right now, which is planned for USS Nimitz (Commissioned 3 May 1975 and thus now half a century old) with the second ship of the new Ford class. As for now, she is scheduled for replacement by USS John F. Kennedy CVN-79 this year if all goes according to plan. Construction of USS Gerald R. Ford also raised eyebrows as a prototype with many innovations, starting with EMALS catapults, as she was laid down in November 2009, only launched in October 2013 and completed in July 2017 so eight years total. However, if this seems long, to compare, this was seven years for USS Nimitz and technology was far less advanced back then.

As of March 2, 2025, here are the latest developments concerning the U.S. Navy:
USS Carl Vinson’s Port Call in South Korea:
The USS Carl Vinson, a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, has arrived in Busan, South Korea. This visit underscores the strong military alliance between the U.S. and South Korea, especially in light of North Korea’s recent missile tests. The carrier is accompanied by the guided-missile cruiser USS Princeton and the USS Sterett guided-missile destroyer.

Norwegian Fuel Supplier’s Stance:
Norwegian company Haltbakk Bunkers has declined to supply fuel to U.S. warships, including the USS Delaware, in response to geopolitical tensions related to the Ukraine crisis. The company’s owner, Gunnar Gran, cited dissatisfaction with U.S. President Donald Trump’s recent actions concerning Ukraine as the reason for this decision. theaustralian.com.au

Navy Leadership Nominations:
President Trump has nominated Hung Cao, a retired Navy combat veteran, for the position of Navy undersecretary. Cao is known for his stance against diversity, equity, and inclusion initiatives in the military, advocating for a force composed of “alpha males and alpha females.” His nomination is expected to face rigorous scrutiny during the Senate confirmation process. politico.com

Submarine Shipbuilding Challenges:
John Phelan, nominated by President Trump for Secretary of the Navy, has outlined strategies to address delays and budget overruns in submarine construction. His approach includes revitalizing the U.S. industrial base by investing in shipyards, attracting talent to shipbuilding careers, and learning from international shipbuilding practices. businessinsider.com

Maritime Strategy Amidst Global Competition:
The U.S. is reassessing its maritime strategy due to growing tensions with China. Efforts are underway to rejuvenate the American merchant marine and shipbuilding industry, recognizing their importance to national security. Legislative proposals, such as the “SHIPS Act,” aim to bolster the U.S.’s maritime capabilities in response to China’s significant investments in its maritime sector.

USN vs. PLAN, who will win ?

The United States Navy (USN) as a maritime service branch of the United States Department of Defense is still today the most powerful navy, with the largest displacement at 4.5 million tons in 2021, but not the largest fleet in pure terms of ships. One elephant in the room given the current geopolitical context is its standing compare to the world’s second largest navy, the People’s Liberation Army Navy or PLAN. This comparison had been done to death in medias so i will simply underline key differences here:
-The PLAN has more ships indeed over 790 versus 300, but most are frigates and corvettes or coastal FAC(M).
-In terms of missile destroyers, the US has a clear advantage with the Arleigh Burke class, in numbers and homogeneity.
-Same for submarines. The PLAN had more, but most are smaller diesel-electric and AIP submarines, and only four SSBNs. The USN has only large SSNs, as well as around 14 SSBNs.
-For Aircraft carriers, this is not even a contest. The USN still has the world’s largest aircraft carrier fleet, with 11 in service, plus one in trials, two under construction, six planned. The PLAN currently has only three carriers, the oldest now officially a training carrier (sister ship of varyag of dubious use) with two STOBAR and only the last and third being larger and a CATOBAR (still not fully operational) with more planned. More so, they lacked the experience of the USN, going back to 1922, so more than 104 years.
Now, a fleet is nothing without its logistic support. The USN has as of 2024 a strenght of 336,978 personnel on active duty, 101,583 in the Ready Reserve. The PLAN has 384,000 active personnel as of 2025, all comprised, so roughly comparable, but it’s logistic fleet is simply in its infancy. The USN also possesses some 4,012 operational aircraft in 2023 versus PLAN’s 600, and a far larger amphibious fleet as well, in quantity and quality.
So even if the PLAN on paper is twice as large as the USN today, the quality is simply not there yet.
However there are some worrying prospects:
-First off, the USN in case of war, let say with Taiwan, could only concentrate so much of its assets locally, perhaps four CSGs and two Amphibious CGs.
-Second, there is a clear recruitment crisis (not unique to the US), partially compensated by more automation and efforts made in better pay and conditions, and sometimes a more lax discipline. In the 2000s for example they had been a number of poor maintenance cases and abnormal suicide rates.
-Third, there is clearly a shipbuilding imbalance between the US and China which had been underlines in many reports. US shipbuilding industry is strggling today to keep delays and costs, and simply deliver the goods. Reasons are multiple and complex, and they had been senate investigations and congress commissions to undeline some of these reasons.

The USN Stance Today

Pacific Rim exercise with the South Korean Navy

The United States Navy is not the oldest around, it traces however its root to the 1780s Continental Navy and American Revolutionary War, created its founding myths in the Barbary pirates war, and really started in 1794 with the creation of “super frigatesé, one of which is still active and comissioned today (see below). It saw a rapid rize and fall during and after the American Civil War, playing a vital role by blockading the Confederacy. It’s story bounced again building confidence in the 1898 war with Spain, played its role in WWI, even modest, but was instrumental for its survival in World War II to defeat Imperial Japan, emerging as the most powerful navy in the world, a status that was kept unchallenged for many decades.

Missions

The Navy must recruit, train, equip, and organize a combat ready Naval force operative in wartime as well as in peacetime, maintaining security and conventional as well as nuclear deterrence (via its SSBN) arm through “sustained forward presence”.
As stated by the U.S. Navy training manuals the overall mission is “to be prepared to conduct prompt and sustained combat operations in support of the national interest.” The USN must maintain its primacy on the global stage on sea control, power projection, deterrence, maritime security, and sealift.

The core missions of the USN today is still to maintain a global presence, maintaining at all times CSG or Carrier Strike Groups as the core of its active organization in areas such as the Western Pacific, Mediterranean, and Indian Ocean, ready to answer international crisis at any moment. The archetypal blue-water navy, project force on any corner of the world, and ready for forward deployments in peacetime as well as rapid response, this is the most visible actor in American foreign and military policy. The USN has its place in the Department of the Navy alongside the United States Marine Corps, but not the Coast Guard, which is dependent of the treasury. The secretary of the Navy is a civilian appointment, part of the nominations made by all new administration, subordonated to the Department of Defense headed by the secretary of defense. The chief of naval operations (CNO) is the most senior Navy officer and true link with carrier officers and whole adminstration of the USN.

Cold War Legacy

The massive A3J-1 Vigilante launched from USS Enteprise. In the late 1940s the USN tried to push the idea of projecting nuclear bombers from its carriers. As shown by the case of USS United States (CVA-58), the US Air Force won this round and futuristic models like the Vigilante were reconverted from bombers to fast long range reconnaissance assets.

Maintaining strength, and Decisive Deployments

Unlike many historical examples, the wartime inflation of a navy in wartime was followed by a radical peacetime decrease (like the Royal Navy during and after WW2), the USN was already the second largest in 1939, became by far the largest in 1945 and maintained its size even in the Cold War. If many plans and constructions had been cancelled in 1945, from 1947 the danger posed by the Soviet Union in what became the Cold War force the U.S. Navy to procure the “shield of the free world”, mostly protecting Europe and its allies across the globe, and maintain an edge in technological advances by developing new weapons systems.
The naval strategy soon adopted the emphasis on carrier battle groups, a versatile forward projection asset which is still at the core of USN doctrine today. The Navy had been pivotal in both the Korean and Vietnam War, as well as instrumental in blockading Cuba and help to solve the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Albeit there was clearly a deflation of budget post Vietnam, late Cold War operations still included the USN such as its Persian Gulf presence, against Iran in 1987-1988 and Operation Praying Mantis, post-cold war Urgent Fury, Desert Shield, Desert Storm, Deliberate Force, Allied Force, Desert Fox and Southern Watch. This was alongside peacetime roles such as inter-service and international fleet training, notably through the frame of NATO in the west, RIMPAC in the mid-Pacific theatre and UNITAS in South America.

Carrier Strike Groups

Formerly “CBG” or “Carrier Battle Groups” they are the bedrock today of US policy on all the seas, a true symbol of its power projection.

See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carrier_strike_group

The pillar of US Nuclear Deterrence

The third aspect is the use of ballistic missile submarines and in general early inter-service rivalry on who would possess the primacy in nuclear deterrence. If initially the Navy in the 1950s lost to the US Air Force and was forced to concentrate on SSBNs, they won the long game as today the latter is the pillar of US nuclear deterrence, due to the fact this asset is both “permanent” and “invisible”.
Which was not the case of land based missiles, still extant for some, but largely seen as obsolete due to their fixed and known location, and a far more limited land tactical asset, while the Air Force, apart modernized Minuteman missiles, counts on its equally stealthy B-2 bombers, albeit in short supply, and its old school, but below radar Rockwell B-1B. Not counting its fleet of 70+ years old B-52s for traditional carpet bombing but also nuclear capable with cruise missiles.

SSBNs developed from the 1950s are now an important aspect of the United States’ nuclear strategic deterrence policy. The US possesses in that area, like for carriers, the greatest experience and numbers. In the cold war, the famous “41 for freedom” traduced the goal of maintaining a fleet of 41 SSBNs with half always at sea. The post-cold war budget cuts meant the USN reduced its sub fleet to the sole Ohio class SSBNs, which carried more missiles, and more MIRVs (20 × Trident II D5 SLBM x 12 MIRV each, 240 total). In theory, a single Ohio class sub deployed from the US east coast could strike all Soviet cities of large and medium size in one full launch.

In total, 24 were built, the first scheduled for decommission and replacement by the new Columbia class (see later). The latter goes back down to 16 missiles, the same Trident D5 as before, but with planned upgrade to the D6 and greater emphasis on strike and cruiser missiles. Some Ohio class had been, indeed treaty-wise, converted and reclassed as SSGNs, and due to their large silos could carry up to 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles. They could play a role similar to the ex-Soviet SSGNs such as the OSCAR class in a surface engagement, or more likely replace the long wanted alternative to vintage battleships of the Iowa class as a coastal bombardment asset for land operation (something attempted for the Zumwalt among others). The Tomahawk can strike (Block Vb) beyond 1035+ miles (1666 km, exact range classified). Even with assisted shells, a battleship would be limited to around 90km at best, and with arguably lower accuracy.

Dividends of Peace ?

The U.S. Navy continues to be a major support to U.S. interests in the 21st century, shifting its focus from a large-scale war with the Soviet Navy to asymetric warfare, special operations, strike missions in regional crisis. If some assets remained “standard” and are not dicussed since the doctrine did not changed such as Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft carrier, Arleigh Burke class destroyers, and new SSN-SSBNs, the rest of the surface fleet was in disarray. The USN maintained for example an impressive fleet of cruisers until the very end of the cold war and beyond: Nine nuclear-powered (1 Long Beach, 2 California, 4 Virginia, 1 Truxtun and 1 Bainbrige), 45 conventionally-powered (9 Belknap, 9 Truxtun, 27 Ticonderoga). As of 2020, only the “Tico” remained. But unlike all the others they had the AEGIS system and cost less to operate. But even these are on the path of retirement (see later) wthout clear replacement albeit the Zumwalt class for many should be reclassed as destroyers. However the term “cruiser” for many is now obsolete as current Arleigh Burke class destroyers are equipped the same and even more capable in many ways.

This post cold war, “dividend of peace” effected more drastically Europe, by far, but it also impacted the USN with massive ships retirements, concentration on a few classes. But the most striking aspect of this massive decrease was on the field of smaller ships. During the whole cold war, the USN maintain a large fleet of frigates, which role was clearly defined as ASW assets. For many decades and until the end of the cold war, this means the Knox and then O.H. perry classes of frigates. If the Knox are now gone, many exported, on the 71 Oliver Hazard Perry built 1975-2004, “only” 45 remained. They are on the way out, provided enough of the new -and more capable- Constellation class could be provided. The difference between the two are massive, since the latter are far more capable in all direction (air sea, and undersea warfare) whereas the OH Perry were more ASW-oriented, as were the Spruance class destroyers. Both were of the same generation with a genesis in the Vietnam era to answer the growing SSN/SSGN and SSN fleet of nuclear-powered Soviet submarines, adding their numbers to an already massive (300+) conventional submarine fleet.

2000s Doctrine Change

The most symbolic vessels of these years of uncertainty were the Littoral combat ship. They were designed as semi-experimental vessels, not successors to Frigates, nor corvettes either, but very modular vessels fir for peacetime missions at lower cost: Maintaining international global order, safeguarding global trade and protecting allied nations. They were to be able to fulfill a large range of low-intensity missions, including surveillance, SAR, policing, and spec-cops. On 17 October 2007, the USN, U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Coast Guard adopted a new maritime strategy, the “Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower”. In there was the notion of prevention of war in the same depth in operation than the conduct of war. It was basically a conventional deterrence policy at sea, a guarantee of “pax americana”. That strategy was presented by all three heads of these branches, the Chief of Naval Operations, Commandant of the Marine Corps, and Commandant of the Coast Guard, at the International Sea Power Symposium in Newport, Rhode Island.

This new strategy emphasis recoignized economic links of the US in the global economy and how to prevent any disruption in regional theaters, wether it be man-made or natural. All factors that could adversely impact the U.S. economy and quality of life. This the Navy, Coast Guard, and Marine Corps were supposed to work collectively with each other as well as coordinate international partners to prevent such crisis from even occurring, and if needed, to react quickly and restore order. It is not far away from the naval doctrine before WWI which ensured the prosperity of Great Britain.

In 2010, Admiral Gary Roughead as CNO noted however the effects of opost-cold war massive decommissions, conrasting to still unfliching demands on the Navy. He noted in fact, and against all attempts, they have grown. In the new context of declining budgets and seeingly more decommissions in the future, the U.S. Navy should rely more on international partnerships in each theater. This also went for a regular push from the US to ensure NATO kept it’s naval commitment, and actually reach a 2% GDP expenses. Indeed apart France and UK, traditional powers with a claimed global reach, Spain, Italy or Turkey were the only relatively sizeable naval powers of some importance that could supmenet the USN’s 6th fleet in the Med, but the Bundesmarine suffered greatly from post cold war shrinking and drastic drop in capabilities. Canada was also crititized for the same reasons.

The 2013 budget requested the navy was con strained to keep all eleven big deck carriers, even if its means reducung smaller ships, delaying SSBN replacement.But by 2014 just as the war flare up in Crimea, the USN was found unable to maintain eleven aircraft carriers after the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013. Under CNO Jonathan Greenert, it was argued that a ten ship carrier fleet could just not fufill the expected presence and military requirements. First Sea Lord George Zambellas clearly underline the “resource-led” planning that affected the fleet.

From 2015 onwads alarms were raised at the contrasted picture of a shrunk USN strugging to fill its mission book, whereas the PLAN was clearly outpacing it. This was the “Pivot to East Asia”. Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus stated that same year that 60% of the total U.S. fleet needed to be deployed to the Pacific by 2020 and a new, massive 30-year shipbuilding plan published by 2016 stressed out a fleet of 350 ships to meet these new challenges. A provision of the 2018 National Defense Authorization Act even added 5 more ships to this total “as soon as practicable” but there was no funding nor timeline given. Under the first Trump administration (2017-21) the objectove of a “500 ships fleet” was stated, but again, no formal commitment made. However its was precised that this number should included naval unmanned systems, and this will only grew after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine and clear demonstration of the relevance of drone warfare.
Considerable investoments had been done in this area, which also solves the issue of undermanned vessels and air park. Still iun its infancy in terms of doctrine, on the tactical and strategic level, considerable ibnvestiments are currently made in this field for evaluation, as well as new types of weaponry such as energy directed weapon and RWS in general (remote weaponry).

Current Organization

The U.S. Navy depends of the administration body under the Department of the Navy. Its civilian leadership is the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) named each time there is a new administration. Given the political color this could means inflexion even in long term programs especially true for the Navy which calculates any new classes over more than a decade between initialdevelopment to service and on average three decades of service behind, meaning roughly 40 years between initial idea to decommission. In the meantime, this means countless political alternances.
The most senior naval officer is the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) a 4-star admiral reporting to the Secretary of the Navy at all times and making the link between the administration and navy corps. The CNO is part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), playing an advisory role to the President but without impact on the chain on command. The Secretary of the Navy (SecNav) and Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) are tasked of organizing, recruiting, training, and equipping the Navy making it operaitonal inside the unified combatant commands.

Components

1-United States Fleet Forces Command (formerly United States Atlantic Fleet)
2-United States Pacific Fleet
3-United States Naval Forces Central Command
4-United States Naval Forces Europe
5-Naval Network Warfare Command
6-Navy Reserve
7-United States Naval Special Warfare Command
8-Operational Test and Evaluation Force.
9-Fleet Forces Command: Military Sealift Command, Naval Expeditionary Combat Command, Naval Information Forces.

Fleets

Seven active fleets but eleven CSGs (Carrier Strike Groups). The difference comprises ships in maintenance and just between rotating deployments, albeit a fleet could operate at any moment two ore more CSGs. These are the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Tenth Fleets led each by a vice admiral. The Fourth Fleet is led by a rear admiral. They are managed together on the global sphere by the Fleet Forces Command (former Atlantic Fleet, 3 stars admiral) as well as the Pacific Fleet (3 stars admiral), Naval Forces Europe-Africa (3 stars admiral), Naval Forces Central Command (Cdr 5th Fleet).

-The First Fleet was created from 1947, redesignated the 3rd Fleet in early 1973.
-The Second Fleet was deactivated between September 2011 and August 2018 amid tensions with Russia, headquartered in Norfolk (East Coast-North Atlantic)
-The Fourth Fleet was reactivated in 2008 to control operations of the Southern Command (Central and South America)

Shore establishments

Shore establishments supports fleet missions through their land facilities. List of shore establishment command in April 2011:
-Naval Education and Training Command
-Navy Installations Command
-Naval Meteorology and Oceanography Command
-Naval Information Warfare Systems Command
-Naval Facilities Engineering Command
-Naval Supply Systems Command
-Naval Air Systems Command
-Naval Sea Systems Command
-Bureau of Medicine and Surgery
-Bureau of Naval Personnel
-Office of Naval Research
-Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)
-United States Naval Academy
-Naval Safety Command
-Naval Aviation Warfighting Development Center
-United States Naval Observatory
-Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and CNO sometimes listed as well, but they are above the rest.

United States Marine Corps

In redaction

Bases

Map of naval bases in the United States
In redaction

USCG today

In redaction

Current Carrier Strike Groups

In redaction

Carrier Strike Group One: USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70) CAW2, DESRON-1, NS San Diego, California
Carrier Strike Group Two: USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69), CAW 3, DESRON-22 NS Norfolk, Virginia
Carrier Strike Group Three: USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) CAW 9, DESRON-21, NS San Diego, California
Carrier Strike Group Five: USS George Washington (CVN-73), CAW 5, DESRON-15 FAB Yokosuka, Japan
Carrier Strike Group Eight: USS Harry S. Truman (CVN-75) CAW 1, DESRON-28 NS Norfolk, Virginia
Carrier Strike Group Nine: USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN-71) CAW 11, DESRON-9, NS San Diego, California
Carrier Strike Group Ten: USS George H. W. Bush (CVN-77) CAW 7, DESRON-26, NS Norfolk, Virginia
Carrier Strike Group Eleven: USS Nimitz (CVN-68) CAW 17, DESRON-23 NS Everett, Washington
Carrier Strike Group Twelve: USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) CAW 8, DESRON-2 NS Norfolk, Virginia

Current USN Aviation

In redaction

List

Carrier Planes

F/A-18E/F Super Hornet: 421 (76 on order)
F-35C Lightning II: F-35C: 30 (16+188 on order)
E-2C/D Hawkeye: 97 (27 on order)
EP-3E ARIES II: 12.
E-6B Mercury: 16
EA-18 Growler (EA-18G): 152

Patrol Planes

P-3C Orion: 28, to be replaced by the P-8 Poseidon.
P-8A Poseidon (P-8A): 112 (18 on order)

Others

Tanker KC-130T Hercules: 10
Carrier Transport C-2A Greyhound (to be replaced with V-22 Osprey)
UC-12 Huron: 13
C-20G Grey Ghost: 3
C-26D Metroliner: 8
C-38A Courier: 2
C-40A Clipper: 17
C-130T Hercules: 17
C-130J Super Hercules: 1
V-22 Osprey (CMV-22B): 12 (49 on order).

Helicopters

MH-53E Sea Dragon: 29
HH-60H Rescue Hawk: 8
MH-60RMH-60S Seahawk: 561
SH-60BSH-60F Seahawk: 189

Trainers

TH-57BTH-57C Sea Ranger: 115
UH-72A Lakota: 5
TH-73A Thrasher: 128 on order
U-1B Otter: 1 +U-6A Beaver: 2
F-5FF-5N Tiger II (Top Gun Adversary trainer): 31
F-16AF-16B Fighting Falcon (Top Gun Adversary trainer): 14
F/A-18A/B/C/D/E/F Hornet Trainer: 183, reserve, “non-deployable”*.
T-6AT-6BT-6C Texan II: 293 (29 on order)
T-34C Mentor: 13
T-38A Talon: 10
T-44A Pegasus: 56
T-45C Goshawk: 191
*While the F/A-18C is possessed by the Navy Reserve Strike fighter squadron VFA-204, due to their unsuitability in combat situations in regards to their lack of modern avionics, communications equipment and weapons integration, they are used solely as an adversary/aggressor trainer.

UAVs

MQ-4C Triton (Surveillance & patrol: 30
MQ-8AMQ-8B Fire Scout (helicopter) MQ-8: 30
MQ-8C Fire Scout (helicopter): 19
Boeing MQ-25 Stingray (Aerial refueling): 1 (72 planned)

USN New Weapon Systems

Current U.S. Navy shipboard weapons systems are almost entirely focused on missiles, both as a weapon and as a threat. In an offensive role, missiles are intended to strike targets at long distances with accuracy and precision. Because they are unmanned weapons, missiles allow for attacks on heavily defended targets without risk to human pilots. Land strikes are the domain of the BGM-109 Tomahawk, which was first deployed in the 1980s and is continually being updated to increase its capabilities. For anti-ship strikes, the navy’s dedicated missile is the Harpoon Missile. To defend against enemy missile attack, the navy operates a number of systems that are all coordinated by the Aegis combat system.

Medium-long range defense is provided by the Standard Missile 2, which has been deployed since the 1980s. The Standard missile doubles as the primary shipboard anti-aircraft weapon and is undergoing development for use in theater ballistic missile defense. Short range defense against missiles is provided by the Phalanx CIWS and the more recently developed RIM-162 Evolved Sea Sparrow Missile. In addition to missiles, the navy employs Mark 46, Mark 48, and Mark 50 torpedoes and various types of naval mines.

Naval fixed-wing aircraft employ much of the same weapons as the United States Air Force for both air-to-air and air-to-surface combat. Air engagements are handled by the heat-seeking Sidewinder and the radar guided AMRAAM missiles along with the M61 Vulcan cannon for close range dogfighting. For surface strikes, navy aircraft use a combination of missiles, smart bombs, and dumb bombs. On the list of available missiles are the Maverick, SLAM-ER and JSOW. Smart bombs include the GPS-guided JDAM and the laser-guided Paveway series. Unguided munitions such as dumb bombs and cluster bombs make up the rest of the weapons deployed by fixed-wing aircraft.

Rotary aircraft weapons are focused on anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and light to medium surface engagements. To combat submarines, helicopters use Mark 46 and Mark 50 torpedoes. Against small watercraft, they use Hellfire and Penguin air to surface missiles. Helicopters also employ various types of mounted anti-personnel machine guns, including the M60, M240, GAU-16/A, and GAU-17/A.

Nuclear weapons in the U.S. Navy arsenal are deployed through ballistic missile submarines and aircraft. The Ohio-class submarine carries the latest iteration of the Trident missile, a three-stage, submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) with MIRV capability; the current Trident II (D5) version is expected to be in service past 2020.[103] The navy’s other nuclear weapon is the air-deployed B61 nuclear bomb. The B61 is a thermonuclear device that can be dropped by strike aircraft such as the F/A-18 Hornet and Super Hornet at high speed from a large range of altitudes. It can be released through free-fall or parachute and can be set to detonate in the air or on the ground. –>

Equipments

As of 2018, the navy operates over 460 ships (including vessels operated by the Military Sealift Command), 3,650+ aircraft, 50,000 non-combat vehicles and owns 75,200 buildings on 3,300,000 acres (13,000 km2). However other sources goes for 380. This depends of classifications, such as including submarines as “ships” or not as well as those in reserve, and still listed, and possibly auxiliaries.

Naming conventions 101

The names of commissioned ships in the U.S. Navy are prefixed traditionally by “USS”, standing for “United States Ship”. Non-commissioned or civilian-manned vessels are prefixed “USNS” for “United States Naval Ship”. Names are officially selected by the secretary of the navy as vote for funding new ships goes through the Congress and therefore had political significance. Names are thus often those of important people or places. Importantly the classification comprised a letter-based hull symbol, CVN, DDG, FFG, SSN, SSBN, ect. indicating type and serie number. This practice was only adopted in the cold war. All are listed in the Naval Vessel Register, or “Navy List” which existed in other navies traditionally since centuries, and this is required by article 29 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of all nations to keep records transparents. Now numeri and accessible from anyweere, this register keeps the date of commissioning, decommissioning and removal from the register prior to disposal means “stricken from the register” also keeping an old tradition of ships listed indeed sticken by a pen stroke on the page. The navy maintains a reserve fleet, maintained for reactivation in crisis as well and manned by reservists. The maintenance of these ships is a constant source of debates as costs are associated, though far less in comparison of active ships.
The USN was a pioneer in nuclear propulsion and had great plans in 1960 for an all-nuclear carrier battle group, but it proved at the same time too costly and optimistic. As of today it’s only kept for aircraft carriers and submarines.

The 2010 white paper expressed the need for 313 combat ships but funds only authorized to maintain 232 to 243. In March 2014 minesweepers, surveillance craft, or tugs were included to inflat the “battle fleet” and preent a more reassuring 272 by October 2016 but it was quite stretch. By counting every floating vessel or any description numbers copuld go indeed from 270 to 460 in 2019. By February 2022 this was 296 “battle force” ships, far from what would be needed to meet the USN actual commitments, 500 ships. Again, drones could be an interesting alternative to met this, at a greater initial cost (R&D) but long terms lower costs, without direct personal assigned and everything associated. Just like for the Air Force drones used in combat for decades, it’s likely these new USVs (surface), UUVs (underwater) and UAVs (airborne) would greatly lower maintenance costs, provided the technology is well mastered and standardization plays its part. This is the best guest to reach a potential 500 ship fleet at the horizon 2030+.

US Aircraft Carriers

USS Nimitz and USS Port Royal off Japan in 1997

Aircraft carriers in the USN today plays a larger role than in WW2. They are still airbases for carrier-based aircraft, largest vessels in the fleet and nuclear-powered to greatly enhance their continuous operation, less the crews. In addition to a role that clearly waned off after the endonf the cold war, sea surface combat on a peer naval force, or even ASW tasks, the new sets of role found for these are concentrated on local support operation, strikes in depth, and area control. Plus also since WW2 the concept of dedicated escort hhad more than half a century to evolve and mature. Today an aircraft carrier is deployed along with many additional vessels which together forms the carrier strike group (former Carrier Battle Group or CBG).

Supporting ships include always 3-4 Aegis-equipped cruisers and/or destroyers, an ASW frigate, two attack submarines to the carrier from all threats and add by themselves extra strike capabilities. There is also, and this is new compared to WW2, an organic logistics support for ammunition, oil and supply, often a single dedicated ship. Modern US carriers since USS Nimitz maintains a tradition of American admirals and now politicians, mostly presidents. The current statutory requirement is of 11 aircraft carriers, all currently active, for a near-match with registered CSGs. Each carrier is a floating airbase with 5,000 persobnal including the air group personal and the on board power to match. Since the US Midway and even prior to that with the 1936 idea of a “sunday punch” of 100-strong air wing strike, these Nimitz class (and G. Ford Class) are set to operate a respectable 90 aircraft at one time. No aircraft carrier outside the US had this capacity. This air group is a force multiplier, capable of a large variety of missions and extends the protective bubble of the CSG over hundreds of miles.

Cruisers

Cruisers are large surface combat vessels that conduct anti-air/anti-missile warfare, surface warfare, anti-submarine warfare, and strike operations independently or as members of a larger task force. Modern guided missile cruisers were developed out of a need to counter the anti-ship missile threat facing the United States Navy. This led to the development of the AN/SPY-1 phased array radar and the RIM-67 Standard missile with the Aegis combat system coordinating the two. Ticonderoga-class cruisers were the first to be equipped with Aegis and were put to use primarily as anti-air and anti-missile defense in a battle force protection role. Later developments of vertical launch systems and the Tomahawk missile gave cruisers additional long-range land and sea strike capability, making them capable of both offensive and defensive battle operations. The Ticonderoga class is the only active class of cruiser. All cruisers in this class are named after battles.[95]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CG(X)

Destroyers

Destroyers are multi-mission medium surface ships capable of sustained performance in anti-air, anti-submarine, anti-ship, and offensive strike operations. Like cruisers, guided missile destroyers are primarily focused on surface strikes using Tomahawk missiles and fleet defense through Aegis and the Standard missile. Destroyers additionally specialize in anti-submarine warfare and are equipped with VLA rockets and LAMPS Mk III Sea Hawk helicopters to deal with underwater threats. When deployed with a carrier strike group or expeditionary strike group, destroyers and their fellow Aegis-equipped cruisers are primarily tasked with defending the fleet while providing secondary strike capabilities. With very few exceptions, destroyers are named after U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard heroes.[95] The U.S. Navy currently has 75 destroyers, 73 Arleigh Burke-class destroyers and two Zumwalt-class stealth destroyers, with a third (the USS Lyndon B. Johnson) expected to enter service sometime in 2024.[97]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DDG(X)

Frigates

Modern U.S. frigates mainly perform anti-submarine warfare for carrier and expeditionary strike groups and provide armed escort for supply convoys and merchant shipping. They are designed to protect friendly ships against hostile submarines in low to medium threat environments, using torpedoes and LAMPS helicopters. Independently, frigates are able to conduct counterdrug missions and other maritime interception operations. As in the case of destroyers, frigates are named after U.S. Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard heroes. In late 2015, the U.S. Navy retired its most recent class of traditional frigates in favor of the littoral combat ship (LCS), relatively small vessels designed for near-shore operations that was expected to assume many of the duties the frigate had with the fleet. The LCS was “envisioned to be a networked, agile, stealthy surface combatant capable of defeating anti-access and asymmetric threats in the littorals”,[98] although their ability to perform these missions in practice has been called into question.[99] The Navy has announced it plans to reduce procurement of the LCS and retire early examples of the type. In the future, the Navy plans to purchase up to 20 of the Constellation-class frigate, based on the FREMM multipurpose frigate, already in service with European navies. The U.S. Navy currently has 23 littoral combat ships, eight Freedom-class and 15 Independence-class ships.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freedom-class_littoral_combat_ship

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Independence-class_littoral_combat_ship

Amphibious Force

Amphibious assault ships are the centerpieces of US amphibious warfare and fulfill the same power projection role as aircraft carriers except that their striking force centers on land forces instead of aircraft. They deliver, command, coordinate, and fully support all elements of a 2,200-strong Marine Expeditionary Unit in an amphibious assault using both air and amphibious vehicles. Resembling small aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships are capable of V/STOL, STOVL, VTOL, tiltrotor, and rotary wing aircraft operations. They also contain a well deck to support the use of Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) and other amphibious assault watercraft. Recently, amphibious assault ships have begun to be deployed as the core of an expeditionary strike group, which usually consists of an additional amphibious transport dock and dock landing ship for amphibious warfare and an Aegis-equipped cruiser and destroyer, frigate, and attack submarine for group defense. Amphibious assault ships are typically named after World War II aircraft carriers.
Amphibious transport docks are warships that embark, transport, and land Marines, supplies, and equipment in a supporting role during amphibious warfare missions. With a landing platform, amphibious transport docks also have the capability to serve as secondary aviation support for an expeditionary group. All amphibious transport docks can operate helicopters, LCACs, and other conventional amphibious vehicles while the newer San Antonio class of ships has been explicitly designed to operate all three elements of the Marines’ “mobility triad”: Expeditionary Fighting Vehicles (EFVs), the V-22 Osprey tiltrotor aircraft, and LCACs. Amphibious transport docks are typically named after U.S. cities.
The dock landing ship is a medium amphibious transport that is designed specifically to support and operate LCACs, though it is able to operate other amphibious assault vehicles in the United States inventory as well. Dock landing ships are normally deployed as a component of an expeditionary strike group’s amphibious assault contingent, operating as a secondary launch platform for LCACs. All dock landing ships are named after cities or important places in U.S. and U.S. Naval history.[95]
The Navy operates 32 amphibious warfare ships, eight Wasp class and two America class amphibious assault ships, four Harpers Ferry class and six Whidbey Island class dock landing ships, and 12 San Antonio class amphibious transport dock ships.

Submarines

The U.S. Navy operates three types of submarines: attack submarines, ballistic missile submarines and guided missile submarines. All current and planned U.S. Navy submarines are nuclear-powered, as nuclear propulsion allows for a combination of stealth and long-duration, high-speed, sustained underwater movement.
Attack submarines typically operate as part of a carrier battle group, while guided missile submarines generally operate independently and carry larger quantities of cruise missiles. Both types have several tactical missions, including sinking ships and other subs, launching cruise missiles, gathering intelligence, and assisting in special operations. Ballistic missile submarines operate independently with only one mission: to carry and, if called upon, to launch the Trident nuclear missile.
The Navy operates 69 submarines, 29 Los Angeles class attack submarines (with two more in reserve), 18 Ohio class submarines with 14 configured as ballistic missile submarines and four configured as guided missile submarines, three Seawolf class attack submarines, and 19 Virginia class attack submarines.

Misc. fleet

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Lewis_B._Puller_(ESB-3)

Mk 5 SOC: M2 Browning .50 cal Heavy Machine Gun and M240 General Purpose Machine Gun, Transportable by Lockheed C-5 Galaxy only.
SOC-R: GAU-17 minigun, M2 Browning .50 cal Heavy Machine Gun, M240 General Purpose Machine Gun, and 40mm Mk 19 grenade launcher, Transportable by CH-47, C-130, and larger aircraft
RHIB: M2 Browning .50 cal Heavy Machine Gun, M240 General Purpose Machine Gun, and M249 light machine gun

The Navy operates eight Avenger-class mine countermeasures ships, with four expected to be retired in 2024. Mine countermeasures vessels are a combination of minehunters, a naval vessel that actively detects and destroys individual naval mines, and minesweepers, which clear mined areas as a whole, without prior detection of the mines. MCM vessels have mostly legacy names of previous US Navy ships, especially World War II-era minesweepers.

A special case is the USS Constitution, commissioned in 1797 as one of the original six frigates of the USN and which remains in commission at the Charlestown Navy Yard in Boston. She occasionally sails for commemorative events such as Independence Day.

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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Navy
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_equipment_of_the_United_States_Navy