Category: ww1 naval battles

Turkish Ottoman Navy vs Royal Navy

The end of the Ottoman fleet

Before the Autro-Hungarian Navy was condemned to inaction a few monthes afterwards in june with the sinking of the Szent Istvan, the fate of the Turkish Ottoman fleet was decided in January 1918, not by the Russians, but by the British Navy. As a reminder, the old Ottoman Navy was unexpectedly reinforced in August 1914 by two fleeing state-of-the-art German warships: The Goeben, a Moltke-class battlecruiser (1912) and the Breslau, an equally modern light cruiser of the 1912 Magdeburg class. They were renamed Yavuz Sultan Selim and Midilli repectively and remained a constant threat for the Russian Navy in the black sea, as well. However, the Russian revolution changed the situation, and now the Ottoman Navy had free hands to intervene against allied assets in the eastern Mediterranean at any moment.

Battleship Yavuz in the Bosporus. Colorized photo by hirootoko jr. By far the most serious asset of the Turkish Ottoman navy since 1914

Strategic situation in the Aegean

At that time, the Balkan war pitted the allied armies, included the Greeks, against a coalition of Bulgarians and German troops while the Turks Ottoman Army in Palestine was in disarray, with British troops advancing steadily. The British Navy stationed in the Aegean Islands covered shipping and reinforcements to the whole area, and provided naval support with the heavy guns of monitors and other ships, close to the coast. The German commander of the Ottoman Black Sea fleet, Rebeur Paschwitz, which had these two precious ships manned by compatriots at his disposal, was thinking to relieve the pressure by taking on the Royal Navy assets there, not able to counter the German ships.

The Ottoman naval raid would include an attack on the british ships anchored at Kusu Bay off the islands of Imbros. Paschwitz would then turn the squadron against shipping and the local British naval base. Another decisive factor was at that time, that the allied squadron guarding the Dardanelles was weakened by the absence of the pre-dreadnough battleship HMS Lord Nelson, leaving just the HMS Agamemnon and a few destroyer to cover the sector.

Mudros Camp

Respective Forces

Outside the HMS Agamenon anchored off Mudros, which had only four 305 mm guns versus ten faster 280 mm for the Yavuz (and was much slower), the British squadron also comprised the monitors HMS Raglan and M28, and the Acheron-class destroyers HMS Tigress and HMS Lizard which could be dealt with by the Midilli, flanking the Yavuz in the operation. Perhaps the Raglan, an Abercrombie-class monitor, was more seriously taken by the German head of staff, bearing with two 14-inch guns. However its fire controls were optimized for coastal bombardment, and she was slow and not well protected.

Monitor HMS Raglan, Abercrombie class (top: in 1915, bottom, leaving Malta for Brindisi – Imperial War Museum coll.

Attack on Imbros

On 20 January 1918 en route to Imbros, Yavûz Sultân Selîm struck a mine, but the damage was light. It was decided both ship would resume their advance and complete their mission. When in sight, Yavûz shelled the British signal station at Kephalo Point to cut out transmissions and prevent reinforcements. Midilli sailed to the entrance of Kusu Bay. Both ships then joined to approach Kusu Bay at 5:30 am. They spotted the destroyer HMS Lizard first. The latter spotted them in turn and attempted to close for torpedo attacks but was prevented to do so because of a barrage of heavy fire. The Turkish battlecruiser then spotted two British monitors just arriving in the bay.

The ship then broke to engage them, leaving the British destroyer to Midilli. Soon Yavûz shelled both monitors while Midilli had now to face the destroyer HMS Tigress arrived as a renforcement to Lizard. Both destroyers attempted to shield the monitors by deploying a smoke screen just in front of the Turkish battlecruiser with no effect.

Destroyer HMS Tigress, similar to Lizard, Acheron class

Both monitors also tried to evade fire but in vain. Raglan was soon squared and badly hit, her foretop and range finder destroyed, officers killed. The monitor tried to return fire with but missed and eventually her main armament was knocked out of action by a well-placed shell in the casemate, setting the ammunition on fire (soon drawned by a safety valve). The monitor was hit several more times in her magazines and through the hull, causing the ship to sink. HMS M28 was hit in turn amidships, set ablaze and later sunk after a magazine explosion. It was 6:00 a.m. The battle had lasted for 30 minutes. Meanwhile both destroyers were fast enough to escape the Midilli. With their mission accomplished both ships headed south to raid the allied naval base at Mudros.

Raid attempt at Mudros

Just leaving Kusu Bay, the two ships crossed a minefield, with the two British destroyers on their heals while several British and Greek aircraft had taken off Mudros and tried to strafe the ships. One of the pilots was famous Greek ace Aristeidis Moraitinis, which downed several Turkish aircrafts this day, but the naval aviation had to deal with the rock-solid heavy anti-aircraft armament of the Midilli. The latter however struck a mine near her aft funnel, followed by Yavûz Sultân Selîm. trying to escape, Midilli struck four more mines and sank. The battleships moved to rescue her crew but struck another mine en route and was forced to withdraw to the Dardanelles, closely followed by the Lizard and Tigress at a safe distance.

Soon informed of the situation, the Turkish Ottoman admiralty dispatched four destroyers and a cruiser to repel the British destroyers, hitting the leading ship badly, and forcing thel to retreat. The destroyers then came back to the Dardanelles at Cape Helles only to be greeted by heavy Ottoman shore battery fire. Both ships decided to withdrew back to Imbros. But the battle was not over yet.

Coastal Monitor HMS M28

HMS Ark Royal deployed its aircraft in an attempt to destoy the Yavuz, still not in safety. A dozen British seaplanes scored two hits on the battlecruiser near the coast. But they were eventually repelled by a resolute attack from ten Ottoman seaplanes combined with heavy anti-aircraft fire. One Sopwith Baby was lost and another damaged. The four Ottoman destroyers also now provided an additionan escort. However the Yavuz at this point was badly damaged and she she ran aground on a sandbar off Nagara Point.

Six days would follow with more allied air attacks, registering six more hits. However these 65-pound (29 kg) bombs were just a pinprick for her heavily armored decks. A submarine was planned to depart to finish her off, but only the HMS E12 which could have been available on paper was stuck by mechanical problems.

Aftermath

On paper, the Turkish attack was an easy win. Only because on unregistered minefield the operation could have seen Imbros and Mudros eliminated with relative impunity. Success was paid by the loss of the most modern ottoman cruiser, Midilli, and the Yavuz was out of action until the end of the war. The ship was left stranded in the sandbar until 26 January when the battleship Turgut Reis towed her back into the Black Sea.

At last, HMS E14 entered the Dardanelles on 27 January, just missing the Ottoman battecruiser. The submersible had to retreat, and en route met but near-missed an Ottoman freighter on her way back with her first torpedo. Her second torpedo exploded prematurely, badly damaging the submarine. She tried to escape, only to met heavy fire from Ottoman shore batteries, and was beached and the whole crew captured. Captain White died in the action but was posthumously awarded the VC.

HMS E14 crew posing in 1915 – AWM

Ater the battle, on the strategic level, the threat posed by the Ottoman Navy no longer existed. Nevertheless in the press, the loss of the two monitors and absence of battleship nearby was wildly criticized by the commanders of the British Aegean Squadron. Two pre-dreanought battleships, not useful in the home fleet anyway, could have not only dissuaded the Turkish ships, but also sink them. No praise was given however to the team responsible for the minefield…

Read More

historynet.com attack over the dardanelles and the role played by naval aviation
timesmachine.nytimes.com the loss of the raglan, press release (pdf)
The Battle of Imbros
Conway’s all the world’s fighting ships 1906-1921

Kaiserlichesmarine vs Royal Navy

A missed second Jutland

The island of Heligoland, at the outposts of the German coast, was the object of another minor engagement after Jutland. This was an attempt to lure out the German fleet by attacking lighter ships, but the germans being too cautious, it ended as an inconclusive action, unsatisfactory for both Germans and British.

In short: German minesweepers who used to clear british minefields in the bay were intercepted by light cruisers HMS Calypso and HMS Caledon. At the sight of their smoke on the horizon the minesweepers fell back on the two battleships on duty, the SMS Kaiser and SMS Kaiserin, under Rear Admiral Ludwig von Reuter. Both cruisers requested by wireless telegraphy the support of the first battle cruiser squadron (HMS Glorious, HMS Courageous, HMS Tiger, HMS Renown, HMS Repulse), commanded by Admiral Sir Charles Napier. Both cruisers briefly engaged the battleships, before Calypso received a 280 mm hit on the forecastle, razing the bridge and killing all officers present. The second cruiser wisely sailed off of the engagement while the German squadron, at first chasing, retreated cautiously themselves at the sight of the black plumes of Napier’s own squadron, through its own minefields losing an escorting TB in the process.

The island of helgoland prior to its tranformation into a military base

Motivations

One of the trigger for the operaton was Admiral Sir David Beatty (then Commander-in-Chief of the British Grand Fleet) own will to revenge the recent German Navy’s successful raid on the Scandinavian convoy on 17 October 1917 (exaclty one month ago). Therefore he decided to send a strong force of cruisers under Vice Admiral Trevylyan Napier to attack German minesweepers and their escort, in the hope to lure out reinforcements, while his other backup fast battlecruisers were ready for action. British Naval Intelligence was made aware indeed of the wide effort made by the germans to clear British minefield in their backyard, under orders by Ludwig von Reuter.

British mine in the north sea – Imperial War Museum archives (AMW)

british minefields

The rocky island of Heligoland, before the war a popular touristic destination, later transformed into a military outpost, advanced naval base with fortifications and long range artillery, was the most obvious target in the vicinity of the German west coast (North sea coast). Once already, in 28 August 1914 admiral Roger Keyes tried to lure out German light force in the area and do battle. What followed was called the first battle of Heligoland bight, which saw an engagement of cruisers, TBs, destroyers, and two battle cruisers.
The British hoped to repeat the feat of 1914 although the past action was somewhat inconclusive. In 1917, the British finally started an effective minelaying of the Heligoland Bight, a very long endeavour (and risky, so close to the enemy) because of the neglect British minesweepers were in (not favoured like the “big cats”), and after many delays, the first reliable British mine was itself copied from a captured deriving German model. Mining the Heligoland Bight hampered greatly German coastal defence, 150 nautical miles off their coast, an area denial that they had a hard time to accept. These minefields indeed effectively cut off the Hochseeflotte from the North Sea, even the U-boats until then engaged in the battle of the Atlantic, as a response to the blocus. Therefore the German navy made minesweeping in the area an abosolute priority, straining on ships and crews.

German M15 class minesweeper

SMS Königsberg, damaged during the engagement.

Drawing of the SMS Kaiser

Creating Opportunities

The British Admiralty intelligence new that these minefields had another advantage: German minesweepers needed to be protected by larger units, potentially with quick reinforcements. With always the overall duty to bleed the german Navy, the Royal Navy had there an opportunity that could not be missed. The Germans deployed 14 minesweepers in the area, two mine destroyers, with an escort by of eight torpedo boats and four light cruisers. This fleet was commanded by Rear-Admiral von Reuter , which placed his mark in the SMS Königsberg. The battleships Kaiserin and Kaiser provided backup at 60 miles southeast of the site. Beign dreadnought, they were relatively fast, still. The British approached at the first daylights on the 17 of November 1917, two cruisers covered from the west by the First Battle Cruiser Squadron. In backup the First and Sixth Light Cruiser Squadrons and attached destroyer flotillas, and behind the latest, fast “light battlecruisers” Courageous and Glorious under Vice-Admiral Napier orders. However the danger was, only a selected few had a complete knowledge of the position of all minefields: The Grand Fleet’s commander-in-chief and the battle cruisers commander, Vice-Admiral Pakenham. Napier’s knowlegde was about the older “Line A” but what he knew about “Line B” of minefields was sketchy at best, as thoese were the most recent British minefields. “Line C” was effectively a no-go zone and he had strict orders to avoid it. The light cruisers own charts did not included the Line C that related to to older, ineffective British mines which had been laid long ago.

Rear-admiral Ludwig Von Reuter

The battle – first phase

Contact was made with the rising sun, revealing the German’s ships silhouettes over the horizon, far away as the weather was fine. Battlecruisers Courageous and Glorious quickly spotted the enemy light cruisers while the Sixth Light Cruiser Squadron went for the minesweepers. However Napier, perhaps too cautious, restrained his speed to 25 knots whereas his battlecruisers coukd reach 30, the only capital ships worldwide capable ot achieving this. But his ships started to pummel the German anyway, and the latter quicky were surrounded by impressive 15-inch shells falling around in the crisp morning light, and all German units were ordered to make smoke and were hidden within 15 minutes. Von Reuter capitalized on this to delay his withdrawal, ensuring his light fleet to steam cautiously between British minefields back home. The British were effectively stopped by thick smoke, which could conceal any possible threat, including U-boats or TBs in ambush. Napier reached Line B just before 08:40, but turned northeast to go around the smoke, and resume the chase, leaving the Germans escaping cwith a gain of four miles.

Light battlecruiser HMS Glorious

Meanwhile, HMS Repulse (Rear-Admiral Phillimore) took the lead as well as the light cruisers, both being warned by Pakenham about Line B. At 09:08 Pakenham eventually issued a general recall but Napier went on until HMS Cardiff, Caledon and Royalist were hit by Von Reuter. The latter hoped to cripple them just enough to allow his nearby battleship to catch up and finish them off. Battle cruisers Hindenburg and Moltke finally were scrambled at 08:40, followed by two battleships. This approaching force gave some advanced clues by the flyby of a reconnaissance floatplane that tried to strafe and bomb the British ships in the process. HMS Galatea was struck by a torpedo that failed to explode, but the British assumed it was from an U-boat and some ships thought they spotted submarines, a reccurent fear since the sinking of three armoured cruisers at the beginning of the war.

Rear admiral Richard Fortescue Phillimore

The battle – second phase

At last, at 9h30, the “Royal couple” as they were dubbed, SMS Kaiserin and Kaiser arrived in sight of von Reuter, reassured. Captain Grasshof (SMS Kaiserin) however had orders only to cover the retreat and not engage despite opportunities to destroy several British cruisers. Von Reuter however was not that cautious and attempted to order Grasshof to advance northwest. His signals were not received correctly and the German battleships turned east instead, at the frustration of von Reuter which resumed his retreat instead of turning to face off the British advance. The British light cruisers maintained contact throughout, and soon the battleships were able to engage them. Calypso’s bridge had been wiped out, technically “cutting the head” of the cruiser. Meanwhile, by 09:32 Napier reached Line C, turned south, ordered the HMS Repulse to stop but ingnoring the position of light cruisers of Line C, he resumed the chase, protecting them and dissuading the Germans to “finish the job”, now joined by four destroyers. HMS Repulse in the process scored a hit on SMS Königsberg, starting a serious fire, reducing her speed. Von Reuter went on southeast but the action was over, as British cruisers seeing the battleship’s salvoes, turned away, compounded by a sudden fog that compromise any further exchange. Battlecruisers Hindenburg and Moltke eventually found Von Reuter retreating and did not ventured farther. The whole German fleet turned northwest after being catch up by two extra battleships in the afternoon. The British fleet was back home.

Vice-admiral Trevylyan-Napier

Conclusion

In all, the battle had mobilized 1 battlecruiser, 2 light battlecruisers, 8 light cruisers, 10 destroyers on the british side and on the german side, 2 battleships, 4 light cruisers and 8 destroyers, protecting 14 minesweepers. As a result, 1 british light cruiser was badly damaged (but survived) while on the opposite side, 1 minesweeper was sunk and 1 light cruiser damaged. These were meagre in view of what forces were engaged, fuelling some resentment from the general staff and the public as a whole, in particular in the British opinion.

HMS Calypso, badly hit during the engagement. Her entire bridge was destroyed by a 6 inches hit.

The battle appear nowadays as a lost opportunity from both sides in fact, perhaps overly cautious. The Germans for their part wasted the opportunity created by the arrival of the Kaiserin and Kaiser. They could have destroy all three British cruisers, and successfully engage even the Glorious, Courageous or Repulse that were not armoured for the fight. On their side, the British widly critized Napier for his lack of boldness, although many understood the risk of hitting a non-charted minefield and loosing recent, state-of-the art battleships. The most bitter critics despite his failings to used properly the Courageous and Glorious speed. On the other hand, Pakenham critized the risks taken by Phillimore in Repulse, whereas Admiral Beatty supported him. The press would later expose the deficiencies revealed during this actions, perhps incorrectly directed at the Admiralty rather than the Grand Fleet. In the end the most obvious result of this was the dismissal of First Sea Lord, Admiral Jellicoe only six weeks later.

Drawing of the second battle of Helgoland – British cruisers under fire, made by Wyllie, William Lionel in 1917 Source

Russian Navy vs German Navy

This action took place in the Baltic Sea between Russian and German units as part of Operation Albion, an amphibious German operation. It is also called “battle of moon island” by the Anglo-Saxons. Most of the engagement was held on the 17th in the narrow passage of Muhu Island (“The Moon”) indeed. The German fleet was headed by Vizeadmiral Ehrhard Schmidt under orders of Admiral Behncke. Opposing Russian forces were commanded by Admiral Mikhail Bakhirev, dominated about at a 1/4 ratio, but compensated by the presence of British submarines.

A modern map of the area and Operation showing the Estonian archipelago Saaremaa and Hiiumaa

The idea of ​​the Germans, landing at the islands of Vormi (Worms), Hiiumaa (Dago), Muhu (Moon) and Saarema (Osel), was to install batteries threatening the exit of Russian ships present in Riga. But the Russians themselves had installed coastal batteries to prevent entry into the Gulf, including Ozel, on the southern tip of Zerel. For this operation, the German navy gathered its largest force ever deployed for an operation in the Baltic: 10 dreadnought battleships taken from the Hochseeflotte, cruisers, destroyers, mine layers and several squadrons of seaplanes for reconnaissance. In Riga, Russian forces included two pre-dreadnoughts (Slava and Grazdanin, ex-Tsessarevich – renamed with the recent revolution), assisted by cruisers, destroyers, and three British submersibles.

Battleship Slava

On the 12th of October, the German squadron arrived off the island of Osel, then entered the Straits of Irben, German battleships pounding batteries of the point of Zerel. The second objective was to enter the gulf and landing troops in order to take the city and port of Arensburg. But very soon, battleships SMS Grosser Kurfurst and Bayern hit mines, but survived, while German light forces skirmished with opposite Russian light forces in the narrow passage between the islands of Dago and Osel. On the 14th, troops that had landed in the south had overtaken Russian Infantry stationed at the tip of Zerel and effectively seized the island. But to the north, on moon island, the fleet sent reinforcements of several battleships to support its light forces. During the confrontation, the Russian destroyer Grom was sent from the bottom, but Russian troops remained masters of the Island.

Battleship SMS Nassau

On the 15th, Zerel’s batteries, which controlled the strait, were taken by German troops, allowing the minesweepers to clear the fields protecting the passage to the gulf. On the 16th, the cleaning work had been done and the German fleet was entering the gulf in full strenght, including 31 TBs. The same day, Lt. Sealy’s submarine fired two torpedoes at two German ships but missed but two further torpedoes struck their targets. Other attempts failed however. This same day the German minesweeper T46 was sunk, as was the destroyer V99. On the 17th, they arrived in sight of the south of Muhu island and a battle started with the bulk of the Russian forces withdrawing from the Gulf, massing by the strait between the continent and Moon island.

Russian battleship Slava was only hit three times, but one provoked a water surge, enough to give the ship such a draught that she was unable to manage to get back to safety and was scuttled. This was the only major loss of the battle.

An uneven artillery duel took place in which Slava and Grazhdanin were severely damaged by König and Kronprinz, as well as the armoured cruiser Bayan, knocked out by König. The Slava iwas hit three times, and this prompted her withdrawal after three days. But due to the added water her draught made her scrap the bottom, and shallow channel made it impossible to escape back. She was in the end, scuttled by her own crew to avoid capture between the Moon Sound Strait between the island of Muhu and the mainland, and had the coup de grâce delivered by torpedoes of a destroyer. The remaining Russian forces retreated to the north, evacuating also the troops still present at moon island, not without laying minefields in the process, on which the Hochseetorpedoboote S64 will be blown up shortly after midnight the 17/18th. On the following daylight, a landing at Dago quickly won the decision, then the Russian forces retreated to Worms on the 19th, and then headed back for the Gulf of Finland. Russian minefields were ultimtely cleared, the flotilla entering the gulf the same day. But reports of Allied submarines in the area prompted a German withdrawal on the 20th. The three British submarines had a desired dissuasion effect. The battle saw losses on both sides: 2 torpedo boats, many ships damaged by mines on the German side and 1 pre-dreadnought, 1 destroyer, 1 submarine on the Russian one. It was a blow for the Russian Navy, not able to prevent the fall of the City of Riga. Strategically the Operation Albion ended on 20 October 1917 as a success for the Germans, as they captured 20,130 men, 141 Guns (47 heavy) and 130 Machine guns, hampered the Russian navy there, shot down 40 aircrafts with relatively light losses.

Map of the defenses in the gulf of Finland at the time of the first battle of Riga gulf (August 1915).

Notes:
-The British submarines there, C 27 (Lt. Sealy) and C 32 (Lt. Satow) were present since a while, as part of the allied efforts in the Baltic: E-class submarines arrived in August 1915, but HMS E13 was stranded in The Sound near Saltholm and destroyed in the process of going through the Denmark strait. But HMS E18 and E19 arrived at Reval and soon started operations. HMS E1 E8, E9, and E19 would be scuttled outside Helsinki in 1918 to prevent capture. Four C-class submarines were alsp sent in 1915 but this time through the North Cape to Archangelsk and taken by barge to Kronstadt. One was stranded in October 1917; the three others scuttled outside Helsinki in 1918. The crews of these had a quite adventurous fate, being evacuated by Soviet ships to Petrograd and by rail to Murmansk, joining the Allied intervention forces in North Russia. They fought here as part of a sizeable international expeditionary force but withdrawn from April 1919.
-There has been three “battles of Riga”. The first ocurred in 1915, and another in 1919, during the Latvian War of Independence.
-The main naval battle during these operations ocurred the 17th and is known as the “Battle of Moon Sound”.
-The Russian battle strategy was changed on 17 October due to a mistake made in the transfer of an order.
-German battlecruisers remained in the Baltic in the previous operation in August 1915, providing cover until SMS Moltke was torpedoed by HMS E1 but had luck, as the impact did not detonated its bow torpedo room and she was repaired at Blohm and Voss in about a month, between 23 August and 20 September 1915.

German battleship Grosser Kurfürst during Operation Albion off the Osel island, in October 1917 watch over by Schütte-Lanz S.L.20, a Type ‘f’ airship. Not all were buit by Zeppelin.

Read More/See also:
British submarine flotilla in the Baltic
The Battle of Moon Sound
Operation Albion

United Kingdom vs. Germany, 23 April 1918

The Zeebrugge Raid on the northern, Flemish coast remains one of the most spectacular and controversial feats of arms of the Great War. It was, as these words are written, about 100 years from now, and it still remembered vividly whereas four generations had passed. This is the equivalent of dixit Jeremy Clarkson’s “the greatest raid of all” for WW2. This event, which teethered with disaster and was heavily paid, finds indeed a certain resonance with the Saint Nazaire raid on 27-28 March 1942. In the specific case of Zeebruge, it was to permanently neutralize one of the main German naval bases on the Belgian coast, which then owned two important ones, Ostend (Oostend) and Zeebrugge. The first farther south being more difficult to access and locked by a serie of many coastal batteries, but Zeebruge, which also served as a seaplanes base, signaling the least acts of allied ships in the whole area, was well protected thanks to the massive curved pier of the harbor, and had very potent coastal batteries of its own too.

Bruges docks and approaches from Ostend and Zeebrugge

In Flemish, Zeebrugge literally means “Bruges on sea”: This is historically a canal linking Bruges to the sea, and the first tourist fishing port of the coast, became a seaside resort in the nineteenth century. That of Ostend was built later and was much longer and tortuous. The naval base of Zeebrugge was not well protected (if not naturally) and had a dozen submarines and torpedo boats passing through it and torpedo boats constantly threatening the traffic coming from the North Sea. But above all, its channel made the first outlet for the many submersibles based in Bruges. During the British Ypres salient ground offensive in the summer of 1917, a localized offensive was attempted to take Bruges. But the battle of Ypres which was to allow to create this breakthrough ended with the massacre of 200,000 men without the slightest significant advance (Bruges remained 40 km from the front). The coastal bombardments carried out by monitors being risky because of the German batteries, a “commando” type operation (the term did not exist at the time) was mounted to block the port and the canal in situ.

The idea of ​​the raid came from Sir John Jellicoe, then Lord of the Sea, shortly before his sudden resignation in late 1917, then in constant conflict with the first Lord of the Admiralty and his convoy policy, Sir Eric Gedde. His idea, relayed by Sir Roger Keyes, commander of the port of Dover, was accepted in principle and prepared in the greatest secrecy. The obstruction of the access road from Bruges to the sea was issued in 1915 by Admiral Bacon, who has since been sacked. The latter did not envision a commando operation but a raid of monitors on the locks. The plan was rejected by the admiralty. Redefined by Keyes, the operation implemented three old reformed cruisers, used as obstruction plugs and filled with concrete (HMS Thetis, Iphigenia and Intrepid), a “newer” cruiser, the Vindictive, destined to disembark and support for diversionary navy troops, and two strong ferries from Dover, Iris and Daffodil.

More detailed map of Zeebruge

The three units were completely re-equipped for the assault, on a moonless night, supported by the fire of a few monitors. They were equipped with armored towers, with machine guns, sandbags and additional sheet metal plates protecting the firing positions and the bridge. A crew reduced to a few men embarked on the three old cruisers, prepared for their rapid scuttling, the Vindictive to assault on the pier. Finally, the viaduct and its railway linking the pier (nearly two kilometers long and 73 meters wide, protected by a huge parapet on the sea side), was to be destroyed by two reformed submersibles, the C1 and C3, which were to come ‘recess under its batteries. This was to add to the confusion and prevent reinforcements. All this diversion of the Mole was in principle to allow the three cruisers to win under fire enemy their respective positions of scuttling, men being evacuated by stars. Opposite, the German garrison of Zeebruge counted nearly 1000 men, including the servants of the big coastal pieces.

Particular attention was paid to the Vindictive. Because of the height of the parapet to be stormed (9 meters) there was no question of using his normal artillery. It reinforced its armored hune, equipped with fast parts and the bridge was equipped with 14 bridges. In total he embarked an arsenal of three Howitzer, 16 mortars, 10 grenade launchers, and grapple-launcher, the latter to grip the pier while the Royal Marines climb it with bridges, ropes and ladders , the Daffodil to press the cruiser against the pier for safety. Perils are innumerable, but enthusiasm for the audacity of the operation raises more than one objection. The operation is postponed twice due to bad weather. Finally, on the morning of 22 April, a motley flotilla of no less than 157 ships and boats left the port of Swin. This included, in addition to the assault ships escorted by many stars (74), 8 monitors, 8 light cruisers and no less than 45 destroyers and torpedo boats. The Royal Marines strength then consisted of 690 men divided among the three mole assault ships. Two other blockers were planned for Ostend.

Zeebruge raid illustration, giving the position of most ships

After 7 hours of crossing, the commander Keyes sent to the fleet the signa of the beginning of operations (“saint georges for England”). At about 11 am, the stars began to unfold a smokescreen to protect the tempting targets of the six detached ships, but the wind suddenly became contrary. And while the three assault ships (Le Vindictive and the two Ferries) were only 300 meters from the pier, German flares, following the bombardment of the monitors (inefficiently) at the alleged positions of the batteries, were drawn, illuminating beautifully the three English ships approaching at a pace. At once they were met by a fire of hell, and their bridges swept under a hail of shells. Despite this, they continued their approach to their supposed positions (because they found themselves in confusion and smoke, more than 160 meters from their intended positions, towards the middle of the pier.). Devastated, its footbridges torn off, the Vindictive managed to dock and the Royal Marines to deploy under the fire of the machine guns, throwing their grapples and ladders on the high concrete parapet.

Aerial photo of the Zeebruge entrance, blocked by the sacrificed cruiser

The assault, lack of the support of the arms of the cruisers, destroyed by the German fire, turns short; The men who arrive at the top of the ladders and gangways are systematically shot down by machine gun nests and shooters posted on the roofs of the pier hangars. The rolling fire of small arms will last nearly an hour. Meanwhile, the Iris failed to dock the pier, and his commander decided to moor behind the Vindictive to transfer his men when at about 1 am, the order of withdrawal was decided. The 4th battalion had tried to take the batteries at the foot of the lighthouse, at the end of the pier, never reached it: The men were mowed either at the top of the parapet, or while going down under enemy fire, or running against the a real trench erected by the Germans and under the rolling fire of a destroyer at the dock, slowed down by crates and barbed wire.

On the other hand, the viaduct, at the other end, was effectively destroyed by the C3. The C1, too late, turned around. Without neutralizing the pieces, after the withdrawal of the cruiser, the three blockers were in turn taken under a deadly fire and the first, the Thetis, prematurely scuttled, without reaching their desired position. He had indeed been caught in the nets antitorpilles he had carried with him but twisted his propellers. He drifted on a sandbank before being temporarily immobilized. His commander managed to scuttle him at the entrance of the channel to the lock.

If the bloody assault of the big dyke was above all a diversion, the imperfect blockage of the three old cruisers was not a long time an embarrassment for the exit of the German light units. The operation was therefore mostly a failure disguised as a victory for reasons of propaganda…

The other two passed through the breach created by the Thetis and were relatively spared by the German fire, entertained by the many stars who were running at full speed in the harbor and evacuated the men. Arrived at their positions previously planned, they obstructed the passage between the harbor and the lock, narrower, but still far from them, and in a position that made them bypassable by light units. For their part, the Iris, then the Vindictive and the Daffodil left the pier under a curtain of thick smoke that saved them from certain destruction.

Aerial photograph after Zeebrugge Raid (IWM)

In the end, the three assault ships, riddled with shrapnells, completely devastated and covered with corpses and agonising wounded men, the decks soaking wet of blood, returned to Dover under the cheers of the crowd. The blocking cruisers had failed to stop the exits from Bruges, causing only a few days’ inconvenience, and the Ostend operation had been a bitter failure: The Germans had simply moved the buoy of Ostend, all lights out, 2400 meters further, and blocking ships had come aground in the dunes… May 10 will a new operation against Ostend was planned and eventually launched with the Vindictive as a blockship. But the operation was also a bloody failure.

Photos of the Vindictive and damage after the raid

In the end, three days after the Zeebrugge operation, the dredging around the scuttled cruisers allowed the torpedo boats to cross the channel and reach the open sea. When the coastal submersibles, they were forced only a few maneuvers to cross the channel on the first day of the English attack. However, the British press made this raid a success, cleverly exploited by propaganda. No less than eight Victoria Cross were awarded to commandos, never seen before for an hour-long operation. In the end, it was the Germans themselves who, by evacuating the area, blocked the canal for two and a half years.

Read More:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zeebrugge_Raid
http://www.greatwar.co.uk/battles/yser/zeebrugge-ostend-raid.htm
http://www.firstworldwar.com/battles/zeebrugge.htm
Model of the Vindictive – IMW
http://www.fr.naval-encyclopedia.com/batailles-premiere-guerre-mondiale.php

Forcing the Barrage

The famous Barrage of Otranto (Authors’ map)

The strait of Otranto, between Corfu and Brindisi, which is the passage from the Adriatic to the Mediterranean, was about 100 km wide and “closed” during the war by the famous “Otranto dam”. In reality the latter, designed by the British Navy with reduced resources, was not very effective, especially against submersibles. It included about 50 armed trawlers with Wireless radio that were to warn nearby bases, sending on-site ships from Brindisi in the matter of minutes. Austria-Hungary, for its part, never stopped raiding the “dam”. The few trawlers available on such a large area made monitoring difficult, leaving large gaps open in the area. The defense was also helped by channeling ships via minefields laid near the coast, most of them anchored at 20 meters deep. Also trawlers laying large steel nets supposed to warn them of the passage of the submersibles were placed in several nevralgic points. It is estimated, however, that in bad weather and at night the entire Austro-Hungarian fleet could have passed quietly through and seriously threatened the convoys, especially to the Dardanelles. Fortunately for the allies this situation never took place, and only submersibles passed from time to time (the U6 was the only captured).

A Cruiser of the Admiral Spaun class, which resembled Tatra class destroyers, and were maskeraded to look even closer

Austro-Hungarian May sortie

In fact, the few really active Austro-Hungarian units were squadrons usually consisting of a light Admiral Spaun class cruiser and several destroyers or torpedo boats. More than 30 sorties were made in four years of war, most of them without results. They degenerated very rarely, into more than skirmishes with one exception: The battle of May 15, 1917.
On the 14th, the Austro-Hungarian flotilla commanded by Captain Miklos Horty, future chief admiral of the fleet and later Hungarian famous statesman, sailed from Cattaro for yet another raid on the dam, in order to attack the lines of surveillance. This flotilla consisted this time of three light cruisers of the Spaun class, repainted and maskeraded as destroyers helped by a silhouette recalling the the Tatra, and expected to play on this resemblance to the full. They were accompanied by two modern destroyers (Czepel and Balaton) and three U-Bootes.

SMS Novara photo when steaming towards Otranto

The two fleets met

In the middle of the night, the squadron was covering out an ammunition transport escorted by an Italian destroyer, and both were sent to the bottom. From then on, they rampaged as planned the line for two hours, from 3:30 to 5:30, destroying or bdly damaging all monitoring trawlers, two of 14 sinking on site, the other being reduced to burning wrecks. The warning was given, and the Anglo-Italian-French Combined Squadron at Brindisi under the command of the Italian Admiral Alfredo Acton, sailed immediately to intercept Horty’s ships before their retreat. The meeting took place under the watchful eye of allied surveillance seaplanes in the area. At the head of the allied squadron were the cruisers HMS Dartmouth and Bristol, and four Italian destroyers led by the Aquila. At about 7.45, they were able to see the Austro-Hungarian ships heading north, but the interception of Horty’s squadron proved a failure because of the lack of coordination between allied ships. Only Aquila was badly hit by gunfire, while the rest of fleet escaped. A chase began, full spead ahead and engines overheating. For the British this proved was too intense and two destroyers eventually had to break and reduce speed while the HMS Bristol later also broke off, until only the Dartmouth and two destroyers were still in.

Two of the numerous drifters that became sheeps in the wolf’s den with the arrival of the Austro-Hungarian fleet

Eventually they catched SMS Novara, which deck was hit, and eventually her bridge too, one hit destroying it and thal the officers including Horty hismelf died or were wounded. The SMS Saida, also hit, approached to take her in tow, and the Dartmouth could have sank them both if a “miracle” never happened: An Italian plane detected at the same time smoke on the horizon coming from Cattaro. Fearing the reinforcement of heavy units, HMS Dartmouth and her escort stopped the pursuit and turned back. The damaged cruisers joined Cattaro soon after. The Dartmouth was torpedoed on her return by the UC25 (a mine-laying type) but survived, while the French destroyer Boutefeu was blown off by one of the mines layed at the entrance of Brindisi by the very same submersible.

Captain Horty, badly wounded after the battle.

SMS Novara, showing her damage after the battle

Aftermath of the action

Horty, although badly wounded, gained from the action a prestige such that when the mutiny of Cattaro broke out and a change of mind prevailed, he was promoted to the rank of rear-admiral and commander-in-chief of the mutineer’s fleet until the armistice. Miklós Horthy de Nagybánya will then raised to new heights in the interwar and became regent and statesman of Hungary up to the end of WW2. When the Otranto defense staff were blamed for their inefficiency, no one could claim to be able to reinforce this line without the appropriate means, which did never met the requirements until the end of 1917 with the US entry into the war and Australian reinforcements. This otranto Barrage needed the contribution of 35 destroyers and 52 trawlers almost continuously. Therefore the record of this naval action was mixed. HMS Dartmouth and Aquila were out of service for months in dry dock, a transport, an Italian destroyer, and two trawlers were sunk while most of the surveillance trawlers had been put out of action, also for very long, while SMS Helgoland had only been slightly affected, the other two more seriously. Despite this, no new sorties were planned immediately by the Austro-Hungarian admiralty. For the records, there has been another battle of Otranto, this time in November 1940, a minor naval action between Italian and Australian ships.

Read More/Sources
http://www.gwpda.org/naval/j0300001.htm
Map: http://www.gwpda.org/naval/otrantol.gif
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Strait_of_Otranto_(1917)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mikl%C3%B3s_Horthy

For the Control of the Channel

Dover strait, which commands the southern Atlantic passage for the German Navy.

Above: The position of Lusitania during its sinking

After the famous Titanic, sunk in peacetime, the sinking of the Lusitania remains one of the greatest maritime tragedies in history, whose consequences have been decisive as a triggering factor of the entry into the United States in the first world war war alongside the entente powers. Ten years ago, it was Europe’s golden age, “La Belle Epoque”. Large transatlantic companies competed with prestige and luxury ships, technical prowesses, and millions of pounds sterling in luxury items and accomodations worthy of a the most pretigious hotels, all under the incredulous gaze of the press. Of these, two giant shines in passenger transport, the Cunard and the White Star Line. If the latter remains famous for having commissioned in 1911-12 three huge ships, the Britannic, the Olympic, and the Titanic, whose history is no longer told, its great historical rival had eclipsed these in the newspapers by the triumph of a new challenger, the Mauretania, from 1907. The latter came out three months after the Lusitania, taking the title of the world’s largest ship, and adding the title of the fastest liner in the world, taking the legendary Blue ribbon and retaining it for 20 years, not a small feat. The Cunard wishing to keep three ships on its Atlantic line, like the White Star line, later launched the Aquitania.

In 1914, the three giants were not requisitioned for future tasks (troop transport and auxiliary cruisers) but kept in their original role on the transatlantic line. On the other hand, later, the Mauretania was converted indeed as a troop transport. For economical and safety reasons, the ship saw her scheduling going from one trip per week to one per month and two boilers closed, her speed falling to 21 knots. From February 15, 1915, the Kaiser authorized unrestricted submarine warfare: His U-Bootes could now roam freely along the English islands, and off the coast of Ireland in the North Atlantic. The new models of oceanic submersibles built also allowed such range. On 18 February, this decision came into force and from then on all neutral ships likely to supply Great Britain would be torpedoed without warning. However, German commanders had two restrictions, concerning certain neutral ships, and concerning ships not carrying arms or ammunition.

Lusitania 1907

From February 17 to 24, 1915, from Liverpool, the Lusitania made her 101st crossing to New York, which was celebrated as it should be. She stayed a week at the dock before leaving. In doing so, passengers with dual nationality (German and American) who were to board her consulted the German Embassy which advised against them to make the trip. The Embassy also made a note in English explaining that taking place on board could be done only at his/her own “risk and peril”:

“NOTICE: TRAVELERS intending to embark on the Atlantic voyage are reminded that a state of war exists between the United Kingdom and the United States of America. Official notices given by the Imperial German Government, vessels flying the flag of Great Britain, or any of its allies, are bound to be destroyed in those waters and up to the United States of America, at their own risk.
IMPERIAL GERMAN EMBASSY, Washington, DC April 22, 1915.”

The press got wind of this note and the agitation began to cause some cancellations. Confident however, Captain William “Bower Bill” Turner, continued to say that his ship was too fast for U-Bootes and “safer than a New York trolley”. At noon, the ship cast off the moorings and retrieved SS Cameronia passengers and crew. Three German spies were discovered shortly after departure and sent to the bottom of the hold. 1257 passengers had taken their seats aboard, including – as was customary on the big transatlantic – celebrities and businessmen of the time like the millionaire Alfred G. Vanderbilt, the genealogist Whitington, the engineer Frederick Stark Pearson, the pianist Charles H. Knight, theater actors Julius Miles Forman and Charles Klein, impresario Charles Frohman, writer Ian Holbourn, architect T. Pope, a wealthy art collector…

During her return voyage, far from the golden comfort of the lounges, the Admiralty offices received a dispatch from the coast stations intercepting a UFO radio message from Commander Walter Schwieger’s U-20 who was operating west of Ireland and headed south. On the 5th and 6th of May, the latter was sinking three ships in the vicinity of the Fastnet, the final point of the line followed by the Lusitania. As a result, on the 6th, the Royal Navy issued a warning to all ships present that a U-Boote was prowling on the south-west coast of Ireland. The Lusitania received the message twice and Commander Turner decided to proceed with security measures: Closing the watertight doors, unlocking the canoes on the davits to launch them more quickly, partial extinction of the lights, and doubling the watchers.

On May 7 at 11 am he caught a new message from the Admiralty, and then decided to get closer to the coast rather than stay in the open sea, where he hoped to be safer. Commander Schwieger was running out of oil fast, but he still had three torpedoes left. He finally decided to return, and was sailing at full speed on the surface. The weather was clear. Suddenly, around 13:00, one of the watchmen reported a smoke on the horizon. The Lusitania was 70 km off the village of Old Head of Kinsale on the coast when it crossed the submarine path. Schwieger could not believe how lucky he was to be able to cross the liner, which was coming to the west, facing him. He could very well intercept her, but not pursue the ship as he would have been quickly out of reach. Around 14:10, at a good distance, he dives to avoid being seen, and orders the tube 1 to fire. The torpedo goes straight to the side, at the front of the huge black mass…

As a result of the opening immediately to port in the hull, a second explosion tore the latter over a great length. Testimonies spoke later of two torpedoes, but the official reports and the number of torpedoes remaining on board pleaded the opposite. Be that as it may, the giant offered a gaping wound at the bow, gushing tens of tons of seawater, sailing at full speed. Turner immediately knew what he was doing and launched an SOS while steps were being taken to have the passengers board the rowboats asap. But the list increased at high speed, including the pitch, because quickly, as the bow played a “plow share” effect, she still sank further as the ship plunged. Unfortunately her compartmentation technology dated before the Titanic, and she could not claim to be unsinkable. From then on, her fate was sealed much faster than the former (18 minutes). Turner, however, decided to try to go down the nearby coast to beach her giant ship. But the steamer was now too heavily loaded, and no longer answered. He ordered the speed to be reduced, and the trimmers began to evacuate the flooded rooms.

On the deck Turner and his crew could not stop the panic that had taken hold of the passengers, as the launching of the boats, though this time in sufficient numbers, was a nightmare: The Lusitania had been assembled with salient rivets, and with the important list, most of the lifeboats heavily loaded, scraped the hull down and consequently, arrived at the water with leaks provoked by these rivets. The handling of the davits proved difficult for the crew members, many of whom came from the Cameronia (an ironic timewarp wink at James Cameron?). By feverishness and lack of coordination, turned, either downhill, either with the water, still others fell brutally and crashed on passengers, were broken… In the end, out of 48 boats, only 6 managed to stay afloat, laden with women and children. The end of the giant was terrible and reminiscent of the Titanic, her bow twisted, the rear lifted, then the hull broke from the front. One of the chimneys exploded, and fell on the swimming survivors, followed by the other three. Finally, she capsized and sank, belly in the air at 2:28 pm, just 8 miles off the coast of Ireland.

In total there were 1198 victims, including 128 Americans. The shock was considerable, but it was only the first trigger that led the United States into the war. The question of whether the Lusitania carried arms and ammunition (the British fiercely denied this fact, and described Schwieger as a war criminal) remains controversial. Some believe that “cheese” stamped ammunition was on board, smuggled, and caused the second explosion on the torpedo impact. It remains that the famous undersea explorator Robert Ballard visited the wreckage during a campaign and found nothing convincing. For him, the “ammunition” was stored too far from the impact, but it was the coal dust residue of the affected compartment that would have detonated.

In any case, faced with the scandal provoked by this affair, the Kaiser ordered a “truce” for the big steamers, until September. A satirical medal was melted in Munich commemorating the sinking of the ship and the propaganda seized the case, reinforcing the hatred of the British against the “barbarians”, and cultivating some deep resentment in the Americans press, which was added to German secret operations on US soil (like a fifth column trying to blew up ammo depots) and a secret cable to the Mexicans promising rewards if they attacked the border, intercepted by the British. For all what was wrote about it, books, movies, documentaries anc conspiracy theories which followed for 100 years, the sinking of the Lusitania was an historical event of first magnitude, staying well above the mass of unnamed freighters, coasters, ferries and tall ships that disappeared in this war in similar circumstances.

Sources, read more:
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sinking_of_the_RMS_Lusitania
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RMS_Lusitania

Documentaries:

The Lusitania (World War 1 Documentary) | Timeline

Terror At Sea Sinking Of The Lusitania Documentary

Dark Secrets of the Lusitania – Documentary movie

The Sinking of the Lusitania